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ABSTRACT
 What impact does a forced sale have upon a property owner’s wealth? And do certain 
characteristics of a property owner—such as whether they are rich or poor or whether they 
are black or white—tend to affect the price yielded at a forced sale? This Article addresses 
arguments made by some courts and legal scholars who have claimed that certain types of 
forced sales result in wealth-maximizing, economic efficiencies. The Article addresses such 
economic arguments by returning to first principles and reviewing the distinction between 
sales conducted under fair market value conditions and sales conducted under forced sale 
conditions. This analysis makes it clear that forced sales of real or personal property are 
conducted under conditions that are rarely likely to yield market value prices. In addition, 
the Article addresses the fact that judges and legal scholars often have utilized a flawed 
economic analysis in assessing the economic impact of forced sales in cases involving prop-
erty owned by low- to middle-class property owners. In contrast, those who are wealthier are 
much more likely to own their property under more stable ownership structures or to utilize 
private ordering to avoid the chance that a court might order a forced sale under the default 
rules of certain common ownership structures. The Article also raises the possibility that the 
sales price for property sold at a forced sale may be affected by a property owner’s race or 
ethnicity, resulting in a “double discount,” i.e. a discount from market value for the forced 
sale and a further discount attributable to the race of the property owner. If minorities are 
more susceptible to forced sales of their property than white property owners or if there exists 
a phenomenon in which minorities suffer a double discount upon the sale of their property 
at a forced sale, then forced sales of minority-owned property could be contributing to persis-
tent and yawning racial wealth gaps.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 The United States is in the midst of one of the worst foreclosure 
crises in the country’s history resulting in thousands of people losing 
their homes each week due to foreclosure.1 Not only are many people 
losing their homes, but homeowners across the country have already 
lost billions of dollars in housing wealth. One study projected that 
homeowners with subprime loans originating between 1998 and 2006 
that have been or will end up being foreclosed upon may ultimately 
lose a total of 164 billion dollars in housing wealth.2 Most of this lost 
wealth consists of equity that has been or will be stripped away. Not 
surprisingly, many minority homeowners appear to be particularly 
hard hit by this crisis as subprime mortgages have been dispropor-
tionately made in minority communities and these minority home-
owners have lost a tremendous amount of wealth due to foreclosure.3
 Well before the current wave of foreclosures became so intense 
and before there was any substantial national attention focused on 
this particular type of forced sale and its impact on property owners’ 
wealth, we began work on a research project designed to evaluate, in  
                                                                                                                                       
 1. See Les Christie, Foreclosure Filings Up 120%, CNNMONEY.COM, July 25, 2008, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/25/real_estate/foreclosure_figures_up_again/index.htm. 
RealtyTrac, a firm which is often cited for its measures of foreclosure rates reported nearly 
four million foreclosure filings in 2009. Press Release, RealtyTrac, RealtyTrac  
Year-End Report Shows Record 2.8 Million U.S. Properties with Foreclosure Filings  
in 2009 (Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/contentmanagement/ 
pressrelease.aspx?channelid=9&itemid=8333. In 2009, foreclosure filings were reported on 
over 2.8 million properties which represented “a 21% increase in total properties from 2008 
and a 120 percent increase in total properties from 2007.” Id.
 2. ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING GROUND:
FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS 15-16 (2006). 
3. Id. at 23; see also Charles Scott, Letter to the Editor, Subprime Loan Crisis Impacts Us 
All, CONN. POST, (Bridgeport, CT) Apr. 11, 2008, available at http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-
search/we/InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&p_docid=12002
4812794D7D0&p_docnum=2&p_queryname=5 (“Because of the current wave of foreclosures the 
minority community nationally has suffered the greatest loss of wealth due to the loss of value in 
their real estate since the Depression.”). 
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part, the economic impacts of forced sales of rural property owned by 
both white Americans and African Americans in the rural South. Our 
study was motivated by the fact that very few legal scholars or judges 
have considered the economic impacts that forced sales of real prop-
erty might have upon groups of people who may be particularly vul-
nerable to losing their property at a forced sale. Even more surpris-
ing, a number of legal scholars and judges have analyzed forced sales 
of property owned by low- to middle-class people, including many 
low- to middle-class minorities, as if these sales should be expected to 
yield fair market value prices. In litigation, such a judicial failure to 
consider the economic impact of a forced sale upon the economically 
vulnerable often occurs even when a court has the discretion to order 
an alternative remedy to a forced sale that would likely preserve 
more of a litigant’s wealth or to structure a forced sale to minimize 
the potential adverse economic impacts. This oversight is surprising 
given that legal scholars and judges often employ very sophisticated 
economic analysis in considering or deciding what the law should be 
in many different contexts.  
 This Article seeks to reframe the economic analysis of forced sales 
of real property in order to recalibrate expectations about the eco-
nomic impact that forced sales may have upon property owners. In-
stead of assuming all property owners will fare equally well in eco-
nomic terms when their property is sold against their will at a forced 
sale of one type or another, it may be important to consider how the 
owner’s age, economic status, gender, and race, among other charac-
teristics, may impact a forced sales price. Such an inquiry is consis-
tent with the approach that some law and economics scholars in the 
field of contracts have utilized in considering how people with differ-
ent characteristics fare in different types of contractual transactions.4
Specifically, this Article addresses certain overly optimistic expecta-
tions about the economic impact of forced sales on low- to middle-
income property owners who have few if any resources to protect 
their real property-based wealth in legal proceedings of one type or 
another that may culminate in a forced sale. This Article also raises 
the possibility that the race of a property owner may impact the abil-
ity of such an owner to obtain even a forced sale price when his or her 
property is sold at a forced sale. 
                                                                                                                                       
 4. For example, legal scholars in the area of contracts law explored the impact that a 
person’s race or gender may have upon their ability to negotiate a fair bargain. See, e.g.,
Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991) (presenting an empirical case for discrimination). Further, scho-
lars in the field of real estate economics have published a large number of theoretical and 
applied articles and books that consider how someone’s particular characteristics such as 
their race may impact their participation in the real estate market. 
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 Two recent eminent domain disputes that both came to a head at 
the same time in Madison, Wisconsin provide some evidence that class 
or racial discounts may occur when property is sold under a forced sale. 
In one of these eminent domain cases, the University of Wisconsin–
Madison exercised its eminent domain power to condemn a popular bar 
frequented by many students that was located within a block of the 
campus in order to build a new school of music school on the location.5
The parties settled the case the day before trial was to have begun for 
$2.1 million. In terms of the valuation of the property, the City of Madi-
son had appraised the property in 2008 at $682,0006 and an indepen-
dent appraiser in the condemnation action had valued the property at 
$1.1 million.7 The assessment and independent appraisal suggest that 
the owners of the bar received significant and perhaps unjustified bene-
fits during the time they owned the property and at the point they set-
tled the case. Assuming the independent appraisal was reasonably ac-
curate, it appears the city had under-assessed the bar by more than 
$400,000 in at least one year (and probably all years) the condemnees 
owned it which meant that the bar owners paid significantly less prop-
erty taxes than they would have paid if their property had been proper-
ly assessed.8 In contrast, the owners of the bar settled their eminent 
domain lawsuit by agreeing to accept the university’s $2.1 million dol-
lar offer which represented one million dollars more that the property’s 
fair market value as determined by an independent appraiser. 
 In their effort to maximize the compensation they would receive, 
the owners of the bar mounted an expensive public relations cam-
paign targeting, among others, students and also hired lobbyists in 
an effort to change state law to limit the university’s power to use 
eminent domain.9 In addition, the case was covered widely by the 
                                                                                                                                       
 5. Deborah Ziff, Brothers, UW Settle Dispute; $2.1 Million Payout Sets Stage for Mu-
sic Facility, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, Apr. 7, 2010, at A3. 
 6. See City of Madison Assessor’s Office Website, Property Search results  
for 704 University Avenue, http://www.cityofmadison.com/assessor/property/ 
PropertyData.cfm?ParcelN=070923204146 (last visited July 30, 2010) (real estate taxes 
must be paid in an “assessment year” which is the calendar year after the city appraises 
property for the purposes of real estate taxes). At the time the case was settled, the city 
had appraised the property at $627,000. 
 7. Matt Marx, Brothers Wants Student Support: Local Bar Begins Campaign to 
Garner More Assistance in Lawsuit Against UW Regents, BADGER HERALD, Dec. 11, 2009, 
available at http://badgerherald.com/news/2009/12/11/brothers_wants_stude.php. 
 8. There is evidence that higher income property owners in central cities often have 
their properties under-assessed and that lower-income property owners bear an unfair real 
property tax burden because their properties are over-assessed. See Robert P. Inman & 
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 
1680 (1979). One empirical study has concluded that property in majority-minority neigh-
borhoods is often over-assessed for property tax purposes as compared to property in ma-
jority-white neighborhoods. See Lee Harris, “Assessing” Discrimination: The Influence of 
Race in Residential Property Tax Assessments, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 4, 12 (2004). 
 9. Deborah Ziff, Lack of Harmony Over Music School Plan; Bar Owners Are Going to 
Court This Week to Fight UW’s Move to Expand, WIS. ST. J., Apr. 4, 2010, at A1. 
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media. For example, several newspapers in Wisconsin, at least one 
newspaper outside the state of Wisconsin,10 and at least one company 
in India that specializes in disseminating information about public 
procurement opportunities reported the story.11
 At the very same time the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s con-
demnation case was ongoing, the City of Madison sought to acquire sev-
en apartment buildings owned by four minority landlords in a neighbor-
hood located less than three miles from the university called the Burr 
Oaks neighborhood, which has significant concentrations of low-income 
people of color.12 The city sought to acquire the properties in order to 
construct a senior housing development. In negotiations with the 
apartment building owners, the city made it clear that it would use 
eminent domain if the owners did not agree to sell their properties. 
 In sharp contrast to the university’s condemnation case, the City 
of Madison first offered these landlords as a group $1.37 million de-
spite the fact that the seven properties had a combined assessed val-
ue of $2.27 million and despite the fact that the city had budgeted $3 
million for acquisition of the properties, demolition and tenant relo-
cation costs.13 The city assessor who was not involved in the effort to 
acquire the properties noted that the city’s initial offers were based 
upon an appraisal that included foreclosure sales and other dis-
tressed sales as comparables.14 Though his statement was offered to 
explain how the city’s offer to the landlords could properly be below 
the assessed value of the properties, his statement is actually strong 
evidence that the city’s initial offer was a lowball offer given that a 
foreclosure sale is almost always inadmissible as evidence of a sale of 
comparable property to the property that is condemned in an emi-
nent domain case.15
                                                                                                                                       
 10. Daily Briefing, UW-Madison: Owners Will Yield Bar Site for $2.1 M, ST. PAUL 
PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 6, 2010, at B2. 
 11. United States: Developer Eyes Student Housing Where UW Building Might Stand, 
TENDERSINFO, Apr. 9, 2010. 
 12. Dean Mosiman, South Side Apartment Owners Given Third Buyout Offer: The City 
Wants to Put Senior Housing on the South Side Site, WIS. ST. J., Jan. 23, 2010, at A5. 
 13. Dean Mosiman, Losing Offer for Landlords: With Real Estate Prices Hurting, 
Owners Fear They’ll Lose Money in Madison’s Plan to Buy and Redevelop Their Properties,
WIS. ST. J., Nov. 10, 2009, at A1. 
 14. Id.
 15. See 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12B.07, at 12B-36 to -37 (Julius L. Sack-
man et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) (“Even in jurisdictions where evidence of sales of neighboring 
land is admitted, it is almost universally held that a sale is not competent unless voluntary 
on both sides; in other words, unless it was the result of the uncontrolled bargaining of a 
vendor willing but not obliged to sell with a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy. 
Forced sales, such as a sale of real estate by an administrator, a sale under a deed of trust 
or execution, a sheriff’s sale, or a sale on the foreclosure of a mortgage, are not admissible, 
because they do not show market value.”); 27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 595 (2010). 
See also Potter v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 189 N.W.2d 499, 503 (Minn. 1971); Tremblay v. 
State Highway Comm’r, 183 S.E.2d 141, 144 (Va. 1971). 
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 After the landlords protested, the city raised its offers substantial-
ly but still did not offer any of the landlords the assessed value of 
their property. Two of the landlords ended up accepting offers that 
were more than $60,000 below the assessed value of their respective 
properties.16 By mid-February, the city indicated that it would not 
pay the only landlord to hold out the assessed value for her property 
and that it would take her property by eminent domain if she did not 
accept the city’s final offer which was $28,000 below the assessed 
value.17 To be fair to the city, it is possible that the city’s final offers 
to the landlords reflected the fair market value of the properties giv-
en the fact that real estate prices in Madison like real estate prices in 
most other cities have been in some decline the past few years and 
that assessments based upon data from the prior year may not accu-
rately reflect the market value of a particular property in the as-
sessed year due to the lag in sales data and changes in the market. 
 Nevertheless, it is striking that in Madison, the eminent domain 
case that captured nearly all of the media attention and that had 
Madison residents debating whether the property owners in question 
received the fair market value for their property as just compensa-
tion was the case in which the property owners were ultimately com-
pensated at a level that was three times the assessed value of their 
property. In contrast, in the much less publicized case in which the 
city threatened to use eminent domain against four minority land-
lords, and ultimately did so against one of these owners, the city 
ended up compensating each of these minority property owners in an 
amount that was less than the assessed value of their properties. 
Nevertheless, there was no real public debate about the fairness of the 
compensation paid to any of these landlords.  
 Part II of this Article distinguishes between fair market value and 
forced sale value. Establishing an asset’s fair market value can involve 
a healthy amount of indeterminacy. As a result, in high stakes litiga-
tion involving valuable assets, litigants frequently spend substantial 
amounts of money in proceedings that often devolve into a battle of 
highly compensated experts. Homeowners who cannot pay to play the 
valuation game find themselves at a distinct, if not crippling, disad-
vantage which is a phenomenon that may contribute to widening the 
wealth gap between low- to middle-class people—a group that is dis-
proportionately minority—and the wealthy. Notwithstanding the fact 
that establishing an asset’s fair market value involves as much art as 
science, it is well established that an asset’s fair market value is not 
that same asset’s forced sale value. 
                                                                                                                                       
 16. See Dean Mosiman, Two of Four Apartment Owners Agree to City Buyout, WIS. ST.
J., Jan. 29, 2010, at A5. 
 17. See Paul Snyder, Madison Landlord Might Sue City, DAILY REP., Feb. 15, 2010, 
News Section. 
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 Part III of this Article reviews the manner in which courts and le-
gal scholars have analyzed forced partition sales of property owned 
under the default rules governing tenancies in common or joint te-
nancies. We discuss partition sales early on for several different rea-
sons. First, it is likely that many property owners who own real 
property under the default rules governing the tenancy in common or 
joint tenancy form of ownership are low- to middle-income people. 
Second, the judicial decisions and legal scholarship on partition sales 
demonstrates that legal scholars for the most part have not ad-
dressed important economic valuation and wealth impact issues aris-
ing in the context of forced sales of property owned by low- and mid-
dle-income people. Third, we single out partition sales for separate 
discussion because the partition sale scholarship is the most fully de-
veloped body of scholarship addressing forced sales of black-owned 
land and, therefore, the body of scholarship one might expect some 
detailed analysis of the economic impact forced sales have had upon 
African-American property owners. 
 Part IV of this Article undertakes a comparative approach of cer-
tain other selected substantive areas of law in order to highlight the 
manner in which the valuation issues that are almost completely over-
looked in the partition sale scholarship are hotly contested in legal 
scholarship, case law, and policy debates in these other areas of law. 
These debates underscore the fact that forced sales frequently yield 
prices below market value, making clear how the scholarship on parti-
tion sales has been significantly under-developed and under-theorized. 
 Part V of this Article reviews legal and economic empirical scholar-
ship with respect to eminent domain and foreclosure as well as subse-
quent sales of properties initially acquired at foreclosure sales. First, a 
review of this scholarship highlights the fact that little empirical scho-
larship has been published in law reviews analyzing the prices at 
which real property is sold under different types of forced sales. 
Second, this scholarship, as a whole, has also yielded mixed findings. 
Although many of the sales evaluated in these studies proved to yield 
prices below fair market value, other properties were sold at or near 
fair market value and, even in some circumstances, at prices above 
market value. Those forced sales that yielded prices above market val-
ue almost exclusively involve high-value real estate, reinforcing the 
point that forced sales in the aggregate can be regressive. 
 Part VI of this Article reviews scholarship and legal cases addressing 
the role race may play in real estate transactions and real estate 
finance. This review demonstrates there is clear evidence of discrimina-
tion in some real estate contexts but not as clear evidence of discrimina-
tion in others. This mixed record underscores the potential value of ex-
ploring whether minority property owners who lose their land as a re-
sult of forced sales may lose more wealth than similarly situated whites 
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who lose their real property as a result of forced sales due to a “double 
discount,” i.e. a discount as a result of the race or ethnicity of the proper-
ty owner in addition to the normal forced sale discount. 
II.   DISTINGUISHING FAIR MARKET VALUE FROM FORCED SALE VALUE
 Comparative analysis of cases arising in different areas of private 
law in which a party requests a court to order a forced sale of real or 
personal property demonstrates it is quite important to distinguish 
between forced sale value and fair market value. Because this Article 
focuses in part upon how sales of real property for prices below fair 
market value can strip wealth from a property owner, the concept of 
fair market value must first be defined. 
A.   Fair Market Value Defined 
 One standard definition of fair market value is the “price that a 
seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open 
market and in an arm’s-length transaction.”18 This definition is fairly 
standard across many substantive areas of both law and economics 
and is built upon the willing seller-willing buyer paradigm that has 
been well entrenched in American law for quite some time.19 For ex-
ample, in the area of estate and gift taxation, the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Cartwright stated that “[t]he willing buyer-willing 
seller test of fair market value is nearly as old as the federal income, 
estate, and gifts taxes themselves . . . .”20 Reliance upon the willing 
seller-willing buyer test of fair market value is ubiquitous in those 
circumstances in which real or personal property must be valued. For 
example, taxpayers in this country who itemize their deductions on 
their tax returns are required to make an assessment of the fair 
market value—under the willing seller-willing buyer test—of non-
cash property they donate to charities of one sort or another.21
                                                                                                                                       
 18. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1587 (8th ed. 2004); see also Dep’t of Transp. v. M.M. 
Fowler Inc., 637 S.E.2d 885, 890 (N.C. 2006) (using BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY to define fair 
market value). 
 19. In fact, the willing seller-willing buyer test is a widely accepted test of fair market 
value in most market economies. In England, the Land Compensation Act of 1961, 9 Eliz. 2, c. 
33, § 5(2), holds that “[t]he value of land shall . . . be taken to be the amount which the land if 
sold in the open market by a willing seller might be expected to realise.” Case law in England 
also supports the willing seller-willing buyer paradigm. See, e.g., Railtrack Plc. v. Guiness 
Ltd., [2003] EWCA Civ 188, C2002/1122 (appeal from Lands Tribunal) (holding that section 
5(2) of the 1961 Act “requires the assumption of an open market sale [and] the concept of an 
open market [sale] ‘automatically implies a willing seller and a willing buyer’ ”). 
 20. 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973). 
 21. The definition for purposes of determining value of donated property is as follows: 
“Fair market value (FMV) is the price that property would sell for on the open market. It is 
the price that would be agreed on between a willing buyer and willing seller, with neither 
being required to act, and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.” DEPT.
2010]                     FORCED SALE RISK 597 
 In order for market prices to reflect the true value of an asset,22
the market must function efficiently. Professors Robert Lawless and 
Stephen Ferris have identified conditions necessary for market prices 
to be deemed a reasonable approximation of an asset’s market val-
ue.23 First, an adequate number of participants must be present for 
the market to be deemed competitive so no one participant can undu-
ly influence the pricing of the asset.24 Second, financial resources 
must be able to move freely and without “regulatory or institutional 
impediments.”25 Third, efficient markets must be characterized by 
widespread dissemination of relevant information so that informa-
tion asymmetries between buyers and sellers can be eliminated or 
otherwise mitigated.26 A fourth requirement identified by Lawless 
and Ferris which incorporates some of the preceding requirements 
with respect to the numbers of market participants and dispersal of 
information is the notion that an asset must be exposed to the mar-
                                                                                                                                       
OF THE TREASURY, DETERMINING THE VALUE OF DONATED PROPERTY, PUBLICATION 561,
CAT. NO. 15109Q, INT. REV. SERV. 2 (Oct. 2005). 
 22. Economists and legal scholars have drawn the distinction between the market 
prices that may be associated with a particular asset and the market value of that asset. 
Robert M. Lawless & Stephen P. Ferris, Economics and the Rhetoric of Valuation, 5 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3, 11 (1995). Value is defined as “the present value of its future cash 
flows.” Id. at 11. Market price is defined as “the amount negotiated between a buyer and a 
seller in a less-than-perfect market” and is “an historical fact.” JAMES D. SHILLING, REAL 
ESTATE 199 (13th ed. 2002). In efficient markets, there ultimately will be “a convergence 
between the market price and the value estimated by investors.” Lawless & Ferris, supra,
at 12. 
 23. Other commentators have also defined market value in a way that adds detail to 
the willing seller-willing buyer framework. For example, market value has been defined  
as follows: 
The most probable price in terms of money which a property should bring in a 
competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the 
buyer and seller, each acting prudently, knowledgeably and assuming the price 
is not affected by undue stimulus. 
Implicit in this definition is the consummation of a sale as of a specified 
date and the passing of title from seller to buyer under conditions whereby: 
1. buyer and seller are typically motivated. 
2. both parties are well informed or well advised, and each acting in what 
they consider their own best interest. 
3. a reasonable time is allowed for exposure in the open market. 
4. payment is made in cash or its equivalent. 
5. financing, if any, is on terms generally available in the community at 
the specified date and typical for the property type in its locale. 
6. the price represents a normal consideration for the property sold unaf-
fected by special financing amounts and/or terms, services, fees, costs, 
or credits incurred in the transaction. 
AM. INST. OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS & SOC’Y OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, REAL ESTATE 
APPRAISAL TERMINOLOGY 160-61 (Byrl N. Boyce ed., rev. ed. 1981).  
 24. Lawless & Ferris, supra note 22, at 13-14. 
 25. Id. at 14. 
 26. Id.
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ketplace for a sufficient period of time for the proper equilibrium to 
be reached.27
 Those who work on estimating the fair market value of a given 
commodity that has not been placed on the market often make judg-
ments about valuation relying in part upon objective facts and in part 
upon speculation.28 The ultimate valuation estimate depends heavily 
upon the context in which the valuation is made,29 and also upon the 
hypotheses and assumptions that the person conducting the valua-
tion makes.30 As one commentator has stated, valuation assessments 
“are designed to have normative purchase in the ethical marketplace, 
and this requires that they be plausible.”31 Therefore, instead of fo-
cusing energy upon generating a precise valuation figure that can 
withstand all criticism, an individual with expertise in valuing par-
ticular types of assets or commodities generates a valuation estimate 
in a particular case that he or she believes falls within a range of 
reasonable values.32
 Since valuation can involve a substantial amount of indetermina-
cy, legal proceedings in which valuation must be determined often 
provide litigants who have sufficient resources with substantial in-
centives to hire legal counsel who will engage in aggressive advoca-
cy.33 Moreover, the incentive to make aggressive valuation assess-
ments is not limited to litigation. It is also present in many other 
contexts such as the valuing of conservation easement donations for 
the purpose of claiming these donations as charitable contributions 
                                                                                                                                       
 27. Id. at 14-15. 
 28. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bank-
ruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 70 (1991) (observing that “[s]ince a bankruptcy 
judge will determine value without the benefit of an historical exchange, the judge is re-
quired to hypothesize one”); see also In re Crowthers McCall Pattern Inc., 120 B.R. 279, 297 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (describing valuation as “an imprecise tool, perhaps the best we 
currently have, designed to reach a calculated decision on the basis of the hypotheses and 
assumptions in light of a set of facts”).  
 29. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of Discounts, Dates, 
and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DUKE L.J. 293, 319 (2004). 
 30. See TIM KOLLER, MARC GOEDHART & DAVID WESSELS, VALUATION: MEASURING 
AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 349-50 (4th ed. 2005). 
 31. Carlson, supra note 28, at 71. 
 32. See Keith Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving Valua-
tion Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV. 357, 367 n.35 (2003) (“There is what one might call a ‘zone 
of plausibility’ in financial valuations, ranging anywhere from plus or minus fifteen to plus 
or minus thirty percent.”); see also KOLLER, GOEDHART & WESSELS, supra note 30, at 355 
(“We typically aim for a valuation range of plus or minus 15 percent, which is similar to the 
range used by many investment bankers. Even valuation professionals cannot always gen-
erate exact estimates. In other words, keep your aspirations for precision in check.”). 
 33. See, e.g., John H. Buonocore, Jr., Novel Issues Involved in Direct and Cross Ex-
amination of Witnesses in an Eminent Domain Trial, SJ051 ALI-ABA 323, 325 (2004) 
(LEXIS, Secondary Legal, Combined ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials) (“Contested 
eminent domain cases, i.e., the ones that go to trial, typically involve ‘aggressive’ valuation 
positions and an aggressive defense to those positions.”). 
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deductible from a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income34 under section 
170 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).35
 When valuation is contested, it is common for proceedings in 
which valuation is to be determined to “degenerate into a ‘battle of 
experts,’ pitting one appraiser against another.”36 Such battles among 
experts over valuation occur in many legal contexts including in cha-
ritable contribution tax cases,37 disputes about stock buyouts in cor-
porate mergers and consolidation cases,38 eminent domain,39 marital 
dissolution cases involving marital property disputes,40 estate tax 
cases,41 and ad valorem property tax cases.42 Oftentimes, these ex-
perts utilize such technical and complex methodologies in their valu-
ation analyses that judges and juries feel largely incapable of eva-
luating the soundness of expert testimony.43
                                                                                                                                       
 34. John H.A. Griesedieck, Note, Conservation Easements: Tax Shields with Philanth-
ropic Means, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 501, 509-511 (2007). A few years ago, it came 
to light that there had been some abuse in this area by appraisers who had given inflated 
appraisals of the value of the donated easements in order to lower the tax burden of the 
easement donor. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Questionable Conservation Easement Dona-
tions, PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 2004, 40, 41, 44-45. As McLaughlin notes, in 2003 the 
Washington Post published an article that documented several instances in which particu-
lar conservation easements had been appraised in questionable ways that ended up gene-
rating substantial charitable tax deductions that the easement donor claimed. See Joe Ste-
phens & David B. Ottoway, Developers Find Payoff in Preservation: Donors Reap Tax In-
centive by Giving to Land Trusts, but Critics Fear Abuse of System, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 
2003, at A01. 
 35. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2006).   
 36. Lawless & Ferris, supra note 22, at 10 n.31. 
 37. See, e.g., Hearst Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 202, 215 (1993) (discussing a 
case involving valuation of charitable contribution of film materials to the University of 
California at Los Angeles, the plaintiff’s expert claimed that the gift the plaintiff made had 
a fair market value of $62 million, but the Internal Revenue Service’s valuation expert cal-
culated the value of the gift to be $1.4 million) vacated and remanded on other grounds,
1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25788 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 15, 1994).  
 38. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26, 35, 42 n.69 (Del. 2005) (stat-
ing that “[i]t is often the case in statutory appraisal proceedings [under Del. Code Ann. tit. 
8, § 262] that a valuation dispute becomes a battle of experts”). 
 39. See, e.g., Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. Highland Dev., L.L.C., 836 So. 2d 731, 735 n.1 
(Miss. 2002). The expert for the Mississippi Transportation Commission estimated the just 
compensation required for the condemnation at $197,775 in contrast to the $2.3 million 
just compensation estimate made by the property owner’s expert. Id.
 40. See, e.g., Zasler v. Zasler, No. 0564-02-2, 2003 Va. App. LEXIS 470, at *4-10 (Va. 
Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2003). 
 41. See, e.g., Estate of Hillebrandt v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1059, 1063 (T.C. 1986) 
(stating that a case in which the Internal Revenue Service issued a deficiency notice for the 
alleged insufficient payment of estate taxes based upon the disputed value of certain farm-
land owned by the decedent “presents the usual inexactitude of property valuations, and . . 
. is yet another ‘battle of the experts’ ”). 
 42. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. HCA Health Servs. of Va., Inc., 535 S.E.2d 163, 171 
(Va. 2000) (concluding “the issue of the proper valuations of the hospital property pre-
sented a ‘battle of the experts’ ”).  
 43. One Delaware court has stated the following: 
Experience in the adversarial, battle of the experts’ appraisal process under De-
laware law teaches one lesson very clearly: valuation decisions are impossible to 
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 Furthermore, the expense of utilizing expert appraisers in various 
legal matters reinforces one of the realities of our legal system: law is 
not free.44 For example, according to two leading practitioners in 
Montana and Wisconsin, simply hiring an appraiser to estimate the 
value of a conservation easement often can cost a landowner between 
$2000 and $40,000 depending upon the complexity of the case and 
the geographic region of the country involved.45 In extreme situations 
in litigation, a person’s financial inability to hire an expert can be 
fatal to one’s case.46 Those who do not hire valuation experts of their 
own in many other legal disputes or transactions involving assets of 
significant value, for whatever reason, can risk losing significant 
amounts of money or substantial asset value. 
 In seeking to estimate a commodity’s fair market value, there are a 
number of valuation models that can be employed. For example, three 
well-accepted methodologies used in valuing various business enter-
prises and in valuing real estate holdings include the comparable sales 
approach, the replacement cost approach, and the income flow or in-
come capitalization approach.47 Even if valuation is determined using 
an agreed-upon technique, substantially different values for the same 
                                                                                                                                       
make with anything approaching complete confidence. Valuing an entity is a dif-
ficult intellectual exercise, especially when business and financial experts are 
able to organize data in support of wildly divergent valuations for the same enti-
ty. For a judge who is not an expert in corporate finance, one can do little more 
than try to detect gross distortions in the experts’ opinions. This effort should, 
therefore, not be understood, as a matter of intellectual honesty, as resulting in 
the fair value of a corporation on a given date. The value of a corporation is not a 
point on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge’s task is to assign 
one particular value within this range as the most reasonable value in light of all 
of the relevant evidence and based on considerations of fairness. 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
31, 2003) (footnote omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005). 
 44. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 103 (2004) (“Bar studies consistently 
find that about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of low-income Americans remain unmet. 
The nation’s poor, who most need legal assistance, are least likely to obtain it.”); see also 
Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor: The Problem of Navigating the System 
Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1582 (2002). 
 45. E-mail from Johanna Allex, Partner, Law Offices of Christenson and Allex, L.L.C., 
to Thomas Mitchell, Associate Professor, Univ. of Wisconsin Law School (Aug. 6, 2008, 
14:57 CST) (on file with authors) (leading practitioner in Wisconsin providing a range of 
between $2000 and $3000 for cases arising in southern Wisconsin); E-mail from David J. 
Dietrich, Partner, Dietrich & Assoc. to Thomas Mitchell, Associate Professor, Univ. of Wis-
consin Law School (Aug. 5, 2008, 17:19 CST) (on file with authors) (leading practitioner in 
Montana providing a range of between $15,000 and $40,000). 
 46. See David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in 
Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 281, 286, 288-89 (1990). 
 47. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS 240 (2nd ed. 2002); see also Snowbank Enters., Inc. v. 
United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 476, 486 (1984) (“A trial court is not restricted to any of these me-
thods in arriving at its determination of fair market value. Its valuation analysis may be 
based upon the comparable sales, the replacement cost, the income capitalization or upon 
any combination of these three appraisal methods.”). 
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asset or commodity can be generated to the extent the parties make 
different assumptions in their respective valuation analyses.48 Similar-
ly, competing experts in personal injury or wrongful death litigation 
who use very similar valuation methods often generate dramatically 
different valuation assessments because they make different assump-
tions about what the plaintiff’s projected work-life expectancy or salary 
raises, for example, would have been had they not been injured or 
killed.49 To make matters more complicated, opposing parties often use 
different valuation methodologies and then make very different eco-
nomic assumptions resulting in the generation of highball/lowball 
numbers.50 Given that courts have broad leeway under different subs-
tantive laws to determine a property’s fair market value,51 litigation 
involving asset valuation can turn into a high-stakes contest because 
courts often adopt a winner-take-all approach.52
B.   Fair Market Value is the Antithesis of Forced Sale Value 
1.   The Law and Economics of Forced Sales 
 Despite the wide range of estimates of an asset’s fair market value 
that can be generated depending upon which valuation methodology 
                                                                                                                                       
 48. See, e.g., Neptune, L.L.C. v. Town of Madison, No. CV030478100, 2005 WL 
1524916, at *1, *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 2, 2005) (stating that the appraisers both used 
the comparable sales approach; however, the appraiser for the defendant appraised the 
property at $2,589,200 and the plaintiff’s appraiser appraised the property at $1,496,000 
which meant that there was a difference of over a million dollars between the appraisals). 
 49. See, e.g., Pierce v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 736 N.W.2d 247, 254 n.11 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2007) (showing that the expert for the plaintiff in a personal injury case valued the 
pecuniary damages at $316,000, but the expert for the defendant insurance company va-
lued the loss at $125,000). 
 50. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 47, at 240; see also Bassett, New Mexico L.L.C. 
v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 63, 67, 76-78 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (comparing plaintiff’s $92,806,000 
just compensation estimate calculated by using a combination of the income flow and com-
parable sales methodologies with defendant’s $1,550 just compensation estimate that was 
derived by utilizing comparable sales analysis alone); Rakow v. Comm’r,  T.C. Memo. 1999-
177, 1999 WL 335970, at *1, *9 (U.S. Tax Ct. May 27, 1999) (stating that the petitioner 
used an asset-based valuation to value the stock at $354.89 per share and respondent used 
a discounted cash flow approach to value the stock at $606.59, and holding that valuations 
were incorrect, but that the discounted cash flow approach was the correct methodology to 
value the stock). 
 51. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for 
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 687-704 (2005) (noting that compensation in 
takings cases can vary greatly depending upon the manner in which a court utilizes one or 
more various “valuation mechanisms” at its disposal). 
 52. See Alex E. Sadler, Note, The Inherent Ambiguity of Commercial Real Estate Val-
ues, 13 VA. TAX REV. 787, 808 (1994) (noting that in litigation between taxpayers and the 
I.R.S. that courts sometimes base their decision on one party’s appraisal either due to the 
strength of the analysis of that party’s expert appraiser or due to the weakness of the anal-
ysis of the opposing party’s expert); see also Denny’s Realty, Inc. v. Town of Wethersfield, 
No. 550064, 1996 Conn. Super LEXIS 1970, at *2-4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 1996) (deter-
mining a property in question should be valued at $1,262,000, the precise figure generated 
by the valuation expert for the Town of Wethersfield, and thereby rejected the $840,000 
valuation estimate of the plaintiff’s valuation expert). 
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is used and which assumptions are made, fair market valuation 
analysis is not unbounded. In many areas of the law it is well ac-
cepted that an asset sold at a forced sale will likely sell for a price 
significantly below the asset’s fair market value.53 Treasury Regula-
tion 20.2031-1 addresses estate and gift taxes, and quite clearly dis-
tinguishes between a price satisfying the fair market value standard 
and a forced sale price. Under this regulation, fair market value is 
defined as follows: 
The fair market value is the price at which the property would 
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having rea-
sonable knowledge of relevant facts. The fair market value of a 
particular item of property includible in the decedent’s gross estate 
is not to be determined by a forced sale price.54
In deciding a seminal bankruptcy case in 1994, Justice Scalia proc-
laimed that “market value, as it is commonly understood, has no ap-
plicability in the forced-sale context; indeed, it is the very antithesis
of forced-sale value.”55
 Comparing the conditions of a forced sale with the conditions 
viewed as necessary for markets to function efficiently helps one un-
derstand why a forced-sale price is likely to represent a significant 
discount from an asset’s fair market value. First, unlike a voluntary 
sale, under a forced sale the seller and/or buyer is not a willing par-
ticipant in the transaction, so he or she cannot be described as “typi-
cally motivated.”56 Second, the buyer at a forced sale is often not very 
informed about the property being sold. In many instances, prospec-
tive buyers have insufficient time to gather quality information about 
the property being sold. In other instances, the sale procedures those 
conducting the sale must follow by court order or by statute effective-
ly prevent prospective buyers from gathering the type of information 
                                                                                                                                       
 53. A forced sale has been defined as follows: 
The phrase “forced sale” is used in the law of condemnation to describe a sale of 
property which is inadmissible as evidence of value because elements of com-
pulsion so affected the seller that the sale could not be said to be fairly repre-
sentative of market value at the time made. The conception of a forced or com-
pulsive sale includes force or compulsion as a result of some kind of legal 
process. Thus sales on foreclosure or execution are treated as forced sales. But 
the compulsion may also be that created by business circumstances. For exam-
ple, a property taken in discharge of a debt may be considered a forced sale, 
where the creditor had little choice in the matter. 
Hickey v. United States, 208 F.2d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 1953) (citations omitted). 
 54. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (2008) (emphasis added). 
 55. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994). 
 56. REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL TERMINOLOGY, supra note 23, at 161. 
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one would gather if the property were being sold on the open mar-
ket.57
 For example, many states mandate partition sales be conducted at 
public auctions after notice of the sale is given in the manner re-
quired by state law for sales of real property on execution.58 Real 
property ordered sold under state execution statutes can almost al-
ways be sold by the sheriff at a public auction within thirty days—
and often sooner—after notice of the sale has been published or post-
ed for the first time. This leaves prospective buyers little time to eva-
luate the property.59 In terms of sale procedures, under forced sales 
such as foreclosure sales, prospective buyers are rarely able to con-
duct any on-site inspection of the interior or exterior of the property 
beyond what they can observe from outside the property bounda-
ries.60 Further, unlike arms-length negotiations, bidders at foreclo-
sure auctions typically purchase the property “as is, where is,” and 
the foreclosing lender typically does not provide bidders any title re-
                                                                                                                                       
 57. In re Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass 1990); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, A
General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WIS. L.
REV. 311, 317-18 (1982). 
 58. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-524 (2007). This statute reads as follows: 
All sales of real property made by referees under this chapter [that addresses 
partition of real estate] must be made at public auction to the highest bidder, 
upon notice published in the manner required for the sale of real property on 
execution. The notice must state the terms of sale, and if the property or any 
part of it is to be subject to a prior estate, charge or lien, that must be stated in 
the notice. 
Id. 
 59. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.140(2) (2007) (requiring that notice of the sale be 
given at least thirty days before the day of sale); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1621.A.3 
(2007) (requiring that notice of the sale be given at least fifteen days before the day of sale); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-701(1)(c) (2005) (requiring that notice of the sale must given 
twenty days before the day of sale). Some of these statutes merely require that the notice of 
the sale be published during the relevant time period on two or three separate occasions. 
See, e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2331 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-23-04 (2007). 
 60. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Non-
judicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1421 (2004); see also WIS. STAT. § 846.17 
(2006) (providing that a purchaser may only be let into possession after obtaining a she-
riff’s deed to the property upon the sale of the property and after the foreclosure sale has 
been confirmed). The issue of presale inspections can also arise in the context of personal 
property that has been possessed by a sheriff under a writ of execution prior to a sheriff’s 
sale. To this end, Professor LoPucki has stated as follows: 
Prospective purchasers would be unwise to bid on the assumption that the au-
tomobile is operative and not in need of major repair, without at least test driv-
ing the automobile. The sheriff, on the other hand, would he [sic] equally un-
wise to permit test drives with the concomitant problems of possible theft, acci-
dental destruction of the automobile, injury to third parties for which the she-
riff might have liability, and mechanical problems, in addition to paying for 
gas, oil and other routine maintenance. The author is unaware of any sheriff's 
office which permits the test drive. 
LoPucki, supra note 57, at 318 n.30. 
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port or title insurance for the property.61 The fact that prospective 
buyers often lack sufficient information needed for them to be fully 
informed about the property often results in buyers submitting offers 
factoring in some uncertainty.62
 Third, as these examples illustrate, property sold at a forced sale on 
a particular date after being sparsely marketed for two to four weeks 
is often not exposed to the market for a sufficient period of time to at-
tract a robust number of prospective purchasers.63 Such a truncated 
marketing time stands in sharp contrast to the typical marketing time 
for property sold in the ordinary retail market. There, property is nor-
mally listed on the market for several weeks or months,64 exposing the 
property “to more potential buyers, and thus to a higher probable 
price” than property sold in the forced sale context.65
 Forced sales are often also poorly advertised, compounding these 
informational and exposure problems.66 Professor LoPucki has noted 
that when personal or real property is sold at forced execution sales 
the property is typically advertised as follows: 
The advertising is . . . done in a very perfunctory manner, usually 
in the legal notices column of a newspaper. The manner of adver-
tising is calculated not to attract bidders but to satisfy formal re-
quirements. Property to be sold at execution sale need only be “de-
scribed with reasonable certainty, so as to enable prospective pur-
chasers in the exercise of ordinary diligence, to identify it.” Thus, 
descriptions which fail to give the typical reader sufficient infor-
mation to know whether he is interested in the property are never-
theless legally sufficient.67
                                                                                                                                       
 61. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 60, at 1422. Furthermore, especially in the context 
of foreclosures of commercial property, the foreclosing lender may possess additional in-
formation about the property that can include environmental audits, engineering reports, 
and appraisals. Id. at 1421. However, these foreclosing lenders are not duty-bound to share 
this information with prospective bidders and often choose not to share this information. 
Id. Because replicating this type of information requires gaining access to the property, 
prospective bidders often are not able to get this information, which can impact not only 
the amount they may elect to bid but also their ability to bid in the first instance as many 
lenders require this type of information in their loan approval process. 
 62. In re Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass 1990). 
 63. Id. The fact that properties sold at forced sales are exposed to the market for a 
shorter period of time than comparable properties sold under normal market conditions 
has particular significance given that “the pool of buyers is relatively thin for distressed 
properties to begin with” as compared to the pool of buyers for properties for nondistressed 
properties. Kerry D. Vandell & Timothy J. Riddiough, On the Use of Auctions as a Disposi-
tion Strategy for RTC Real Estate Assets: A Policy Perspective, 3 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 
117, 118 (1992). 
 64. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, PROFILE OF HOME BUYERS AND SELLERS
83 (2008). 
 65. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 60, at 1417. 
 66. LoPucki, supra note 57, at 317. 
 67. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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In one Alaska case, for example, the more than 562 acres of real prop-
erty sold on execution was described merely by its legal description.68
This is typical in many if not most states. The type of marketing of the 
real property sold upon a writ of execution in Mallonee is typical of the 
type of marketing utilized in foreclosure auctions as well.69
 Further, there are many forced sale procedures that make it diffi-
cult for a bidder without sufficient cash on hand to participate effec-
tively in the bidding process. For example, in foreclosure auctions, 
seller financing is rarely available and the high bidder is usually re-
quired to make a substantial deposit on the auction date with the 
balance of the purchase price due within a short period of time.70
Most state statutes governing execution sales require the winning 
bidder to make immediate cash payment.71 This precludes bidders 
from making bids contingent upon securing financing within a com-
mercially reasonable period of time or from making their payments 
by any form of negotiable instrument, including personal checks.72
                                                                                                                                       
 68. Mallonee v. Grow, 502 P.2d 432, 434 (Alaska 1972). In these notices, including the 
notice that was published five times in the Anchorage Daily Times, the property was de-
scribed as follows: 
Seward Meridian, Alaska 
T. 16 N, R. 2W. 
Sec. 1, SE 1/4 SW 1/4, Lot 7 
Sec. 2, Lot 5 
Sec. 11, Lots 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, N 1/2 NE 1/4 
Sec. 12, N 1/2 NW 1/4, Lots 2 and 3 
Id. at 434 n.5. 
 69. Dale Whitman has described the type of marketing utilized in mortgage foreclosures: 
In foreclosure auctions . . . the only “marketing” is typically a classified adver-
tisement in the local newspaper that gives the legal description of the land and 
perhaps a little additional information, such as its street address and the type of 
improvements located on it. A notice may also be recorded in the public records 
and posted on the land itself, containing the same data. It is up to the individual 
bidders to accumulate the additional information they need to formulate intelli-
gent bids. The foreclosing mortgagee may or may not have this information, and 
may or may not be cooperative in passing it to prospective bidders. 
Dale A. Whitman, Chinese Mortgage Law: An American Perspective, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
35, 73 (2001). 
 70. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 60, at 1420. Because “bidders must come to the 
auction armed with letters of credit, cashiers’ checks, or the like, and must have prear-
ranged financing for the rest of the price . . . only professional bidders or dedicated and 
knowledgeable amateurs are likely to bid.” Id. at 1420. Further, even bidders who may be 
prepared to make otherwise competitive cash bids often must compete against a mortgagee 
who has the right to make a credit bid up to the level of the unpaid debt. See Alex M. John-
son, Jr., Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic Approach Based on the Paradig-
matic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REV. 959, 995-97, 1007-12 (1993). 
 71. 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 423 (2009). 
 72. See, e.g., Proto v. Missoula County, 749 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Mont. 1988) (“While 
some courts have recognized a limited exception in which the judgment creditor consents to 
a bid paid by check, the general rule is that the execution officer is bound to accept only 
cash for the bid, as our statute requires.”). Many courts have indicated that in a forced sale 
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Further, in nearly all states, the winning bidder at a partition sale 
must make an immediate cash payment to the sheriff and is prohi-
bited from making payment on credit.73
 Because prospective buyers in arms-length transactions routinely 
make offers that are contingent upon securing financing within thirty 
to sixty days,74 such restrictions in the forced-sale context amount to 
a special financing term likely to produce fewer bids and ultimately a 
lower sales price. In fact, some courts that have approved a cash sale 
requirement at a forced sale have done so despite tacitly accepting 
the premise that such a cash sale requirement can chill the bidding 
in a manner potentially resulting in a sale below market value.75
2.   “Vulture Buyers” Target Owners of Distressed Properties Wor-
ried About Potential Forced Sales 
 The economic ramifications of a forced sale of real property have 
become increasingly significant to more and more Americans as a re-
sult of the current foreclosure crisis that has only gotten worse dur-
ing the writing of this Article. The mortgage foreclosure filings in Ju-
ly 2008 were up 121% as compared to the foreclosure filings in July 
2007.76 By March 2008, 2.47% of the more than 50 million mortgages 
in the United States,77 representing approximately 1.2 million house-
holds, were in foreclosure.78 By the late summer and fall of 2008, the 
number of mortgage foreclosures across the United States was still 
surging79 and the rate of mortgage default was occurring “at a faster 
pace than at any point in recent decades.”80 Observers who initially 
                                                                                                                                       
that is required to be conducted for cash, hard currency, certified checks, or cashier’s 
checks may be tendered because these forms of payment represent funds that are imme-
diately available. In contrast, these courts hold that personal checks, drafts, or any negoti-
able instruments are not acceptable forms of payment. See, e.g., Upchurch v. Chaney, 635 
S.E.2d 124, 125 (Ga. 2006). 
 73. See, e.g., Overton v. Porterfield, 177 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Ark. 1944) (holding that the 
trial court that ordered a partition sale did not abuse its discretion in ordering a sale for 
cash instead of on credit). 
 74. See, e.g., Tracie R. Porter, The Anatomy of Real Estate Contract Forms for New 
Real Estate Attorneys, 17 CHICAGO BAR ASSOC. REC. 34 (2003).  
 75. See Proto, 749 P.2d at 1097; see also id. (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he officer 
could take a check and hold the property until the check cleared the bank. In these days of 
checks and balances in business as in government, checks have become an accepted medium 
of exchange. The result here may have been a higher bid of [sic] checks were accepted.”). 
 76. Id.
 77. Frank Langfitt, Morning Edition: Bad Mortgages Taking Down Good Loans, Too,
(National Public Radio broadcast Sept. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94921465 (citing Jay Brinkmann, 
chief economist at the Mortgage Bankers Association). 
 78. Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures  
Increase in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (June 5, 2008), 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/62936.htm.  
 79. See, e.g., Christie, supra note 1. 
 80. The Hammer Drops; America’s Property Crisis, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2007, at 31. 
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expected foreclosures to total 2 million for 2008 revised projections 
upward to reflect the higher than anticipated 1.4 million foreclosures 
that occurred by the end of the second quarter of the year.81
 An additional 6.35% of those with mortgages—roughly 3.2 million 
households—were delinquent on their mortgage payments.82 The pic-
ture is even more troubling if one focuses exclusively upon the delin-
quency rate of those with subprime mortgages. In the first quarter of 
2008, delinquencies on subprime mortgages increased to 18.79% of 
all the outstanding subprime mortgages, representing an increase 
from a 17.31% delinquency rate in the fourth quarter of 2007.83
 The problem has only increased as the foreclosure crisis continued 
into 2009. In August of 2009, foreclosure filings were up an addition-
al 18% from August of 2008.84 In July of 2009, a record number of 
properties entered default or sold at foreclosure auctions.85 The num-
ber of homeowners impacted by the crisis has also grown, with 1 in 
357 households nation-wide receiving foreclosure notices in August 
2009.86 In Nevada, one in sixty-two households received notices.87
Overall, by August 2009, 9.24% of all mortgages on one to four unit 
properties fell delinquent,88 and by the end of 2009, 2.8 million 
households faced foreclosure.89
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a growing niche in the real estate 
business sector built upon the age-old maxim that one person’s misfor-
tune can be another person’s opportunity. One of the leading busi-
nesses in this sector, Foreclosure.com, claims that its “[w]eb site is 
loaded with amazing bargains that are below market value,” some-
times as much as 50% below market value.90 Some refer to those will-
ing to take economic advantage of distressed owners as investors who 
“[p]lay the [v]ulture.”91 Other businesses dispassionately describe their 
                                                                                                                                       
 81. E.g., Christie, supra note 1. 
 82. See Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, supra note 78. 
83. Id.
 84. Press Release, Realtytrac.com, Foreclosure Activity Remains Near Record  
Level in August (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.realtytrac.com/contentmanagement/ 
pressrelease.aspx?channelid=9&accnt=0&itemid=7381.  
 85. Id.
 86. Id.
 87. Id. 
 88. Press Release, Mortgage Brokers Ass’n, Delinquencies Continue to Climb, Forec-
losures Flat in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Aug. 20, 2009),
http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/70050.htm. 
 89. Record Year for Foreclosures as Unemployment Rises; 2.8M Households Threat-
ened with Foreclosure, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2010), available at http:// 
www.nydailynews.com/real_estate/2010/01/14/2010-01-14_record_year_for_foreclosures_ 
as_unemployment_rises_28m_households_threatened_wit.html.  
 90. Foreclosure.com, http://www.foreclosure.com/top_foreclosure_web_site.html (last 
visited July 30, 2010). 
 91. Stephanie Fitch, Prospering in the Housing Bust, FORBES, June 5, 2006, available 
at www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/0605/142_print.html. This article identifies metropolitan 
areas with high foreclosure rates as the “Predators’ Delight.” Id. Another article refers to 
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participation in this niche sector as “making money off a negative situ-
ation.”92
 Distressed owners find themselves in a very vulnerable state as 
opposed to the willing seller in a fair market value transaction. For 
example, property owners who have fallen behind on their loan pay-
ments know a foreclosure action may destroy or severely damage 
their credit rating. This makes owners of so-called preforeclosure 
properties a target for real estate investors who seek to acquire these 
properties in order to make a quick profit.93 Aggressive buyers who 
are prepared to engage in “wheedling distressed owners”94 can often 
reap handsome profits by purchasing the property directly from the 
distressed owner either prior to or after a foreclosure action has been 
initiated but before a foreclosure sale occurs. These buyers tend to 
target distressed properties in which the owner’s have built up a sub-
stantial amount of equity; they are often able to purchase these prop-
erties from the distressed owners for prices far below the property’s 
market value. In fact, those in the “vulture sector” of the real estate 
sector often target distressed sellers who are not typically motivated 
because they feel compelled to sell in the shadow of an impending 
forced sale. Such sales conditions almost guarantee a sale below 
market value, as made explicit in the following article: 
“[V]ulture” buyers are zeroing in on the desperate investors, many 
of whom face foreclosure.  
Condo Vultures Realty, in Bal Harbour, Fla., organized two 
years ago to represent buyers seeking deeply discounted property. 
It compiles a monthly database of Florida “soft sellers”—those 
who’ve listed their condos and homes at least 100 days, or cut pric-
es 10% or $100,000. 
By June, the database had grown to 1,361 condos and 810 town 
houses and single-family homes. The average discount: 21%,  
or $227,619.  
“We’re creating the idea that we’re going to buy cheap. And 
wouldn’t you (as a soft seller) rather get out now than face reper-
cussions later?” said Peter Zalewski, a former condo speculator 
                                                                                                                                       
this same phenomenon as “Heading Into Vulture Mode” and advises those interested in 
making money in this niche business to be “well versed in your state’s real estate laws and 
prepared for tasks like evicting a family.” Barbara Kiviat, The Bust Hits Home, TIME, 
Sept. 24, 2007, at 52. 
 92. Renee Montagne, Morning Edition: Foreclosure Agents Profit from Housing Crisis
(National Public Radio broadcast Sept. 6, 2007), available at http:// 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14204632 (quoting Glen Daniels, a direc-
tor at Foreclosure.com who was interviewed by Renee Montagne). 
 93. Foreclosure.com to Feature National Real Estate Expert Lance Young During Spe-
cial “Preforeclosure Deals” Webinar; Online 90-Minute Presentation to Provide Current  
and Future Investors with Simple Strategies to Find, Negotiate and Resell Preforeclosure 
Properties for Big Profits, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 27, 2007, http://sev.prnewswire.com/ 
multimedia-online-internet/20070827/CLM09227082007-1.html. 
 94. Fitch, supra note 91. 
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who got out of the market in 2004 and then founded Condo Vul-
tures. “We swoop in and try to feast.”95
 Authors of a growing number of popular guidebooks coach poten-
tial investors through the process of negotiating with such distressed 
sellers who are described by these authors as often being “in a state 
of heightened emotion, which can include some combination of em-
barrassment, frustration, anger, fear, and panic.”96 Some authors 
even provide vulture buyers with tips on how to use deceitful practic-
es to increase a distressed seller’s anxiety and lower his or her expec-
tations about obtaining a good sales price.97 In the end, authors of 
some of these guidebooks advise vulture buyers to offer distressed 
sellers facing foreclosure anywhere from $2,000 to just walk away 
from the property to a price that is “below sixty five [sic] percent of 
the fair market value” of the property.98 Though many people may 
consider these preforeclosure “vulture-buying” practices to be ruth-
less and repugnant, the increasing number of vulture buyers success-
fully bargaining in the shadow of forced foreclosure sales clearly illu-
strates that a property’s forced sale value often represents just a 
fraction of its fair market value. 
                                                                                                                                       
 95. Joe Gose, Auction Buyers Pursue Condo Minimums; Discounts Aplenty, Amid 
Glut; Developers Who Overbuilt and Must Cut Carrying Costs Head for the Bidding Block,
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, June 29, 2007, at A8. 
 96. HOWARD A. SMALL, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO PREFORECLOSURES AND 
FORECLOSURES: HOW TO MAKE $10,000, $20,000 AND MORE IN REAL ESTATE USING THE 
REAL DATA SYSTEM 89 (2nd ed. 2006). 
 97. To be fair, there are a number of investors who are uncomfortable with making 
profits in the real estate market at the expense of families in economic distress. In describ-
ing the downside of acquiring preforeclosure property, two real estate experts detail the 
human element of using this technique: 
[Y]ou will likely be dealing with a family in a downward spiral. Their life will 
probably be falling apart, and even if you deal with them honorably and respect 
their dignity, most families will view you as an “opportunist” or “parasite”. The 
challenge of dealing with this “human element” will prove too much to deal 
with for many investors. 
 . . . . 
When we started, we were those investors fresh out of seminars and read-
ing books who sought to make a fortune purchasing pre-foreclosures. Pre-
foreclosures were supposed to be our primary sourcing mechanism. The “hu-
man element” we describe above was too much for us to deal with. Others are 
able to deal with this easier, and this can be a wonderful sourcing mechanism if 
you are able to disconnect yourself from the troubles of the families you will be 
profiting from. Simply put, we were not able to do this and after two or three 
months of trying we abandoned this method of purchasing discount residential 
real estate. 
SCOTT FRANK & ANDY HELLER, TEN WAYS TO BUY LOW 11 (2007). 
 98. LANCE YOUNG, MAKE BIG PROFITS WITH PREFORECLOSURES AND PROPERTY LIENS:
59 (2006) (on file with authors). 
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III.   COURTS AND LEGAL SCHOLARS ALIKE OFTEN FAIL TO RECOGNIZE 
THAT A PARTITION SALE IS A FORCED SALE
 Tenancy in common is a form of concurrent ownership in which 
legal rights among the common owners are governed under what 
scholars in the field of business organizations refer to as an aggre-
gate theory (as opposed to an entity theory) of ownership.99 In tenan-
cy in common ownership, each of the common owners holds an undi-
vided interest in the whole of the property no matter how small their 
individual interest. Also, each cotenant has the right to use the whole 
property provided such use does not operate to oust any other cote-
nant.100 In terms of exit, any single cotenant, no matter how small his 
or her ownership interest may be, may terminate his or her interest 
in the tenancy in common by initiating a legal proceeding called a 
partition action.101
 Most state partition statutes provide that judges should first con-
sider the feasibility of ordering a partition in kind—a division of the 
property into physically distinct and separately titled parcels—that 
would give the person seeking partition his or her pro rata share of 
the property leaving the other nonpetitioning cotenants as tenants in 
common with respect to the remaining land.102 Under these state sta-
tutes, the judge should order a partition sale only if he or she deter-
mines in an equitable proceeding that a physical division of the prop-
erty would be impracticable or inequitable. However, many scholars 
and advocates claim that judges throughout the country normally or-
der a partition sale irrespective of whether the jurisdiction has a sta-
tute indicating partition in kind should be the preferred remedy.103
A.   Conflating Market Value with Forced Sale Value 
 In deciding whether to order a partition in kind or a partition sale 
as a threshold matter, state courts throughout the country have in-
creasingly utilized an economic analysis which either completely or 
largely discounts any noneconomic values claimed by those who seek 
to resist a partition sale and instead request the court order a parti-
                                                                                                                                       
 99. See infra note 147. 
 100. Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black 
Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Te-
nancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 512 (2001). 
 101. Id. at 513. 
 102. Id.
 103. See, e.g., Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored Looking Glass: A View of Judi-
cial Partition, Family Land Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 737, 753-54 (2000) 
(noting “the burden is so easy to meet that partition sales are the rule rather than the ex-
ception”); John G. Casagrande, Jr., Note, Acquiring Property Through Forced Partitioning 
Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 B.C. L. REV. 755, 771-72 (1986) (observing the “trend away 
from partitioning by division in kind and towards judicial sales is generally acknowledged 
to be universal”). 
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tion in kind so they can retain possession of their property. For ex-
ample, though the North Carolina partition statute maintains the 
traditional preference for a partition in kind, the statute indicates a 
partition sale may be ordered if “an actual partition of the lands can-
not be made without substantial injury to any of the interested par-
ties.”104 The North Carolina statute requires a court to determine 
“substantial injury” as follows: 
 (1) Whether the fair market value of each cotenant’s share in an 
actual partition of the property would be materially less than the 
amount each cotenant would receive from the sale of the whole.  
(2) Whether an actual partition would result in material impair-
ment of any cotenant’s rights.105
Courts in many other states throughout the country with partition 
statutes indicating that a partition sale may be ordered only if a par-
tition in kind would result in “great prejudice”—or among other for-
mulations of the test would result in “manifest prejudice” or would 
not be “fair and equitable”—to the common owners have also devel-
oped, through case law, a predominately economics-only test to de-
termine whether to order a partition in kind or a partition sale.106
One frequently applied common law test courts have utilized to de-
termine whether a partition in kind would result in great prejudice is 
“[w]hether the value of the share of each in case of a partition would 
be materially less than his share of the money equivalent that could 
probably be obtained for the whole.”107 Those who advocate for courts 
to use a “totality of the circumstances” test, which requires a court to 
balance a range of economic and noneconomic factors before deciding 
whether to order a partition in kind or a partition sale, argue that 
utilization of the economics-only test undermines very important 
property rights that are upheld in many other areas of property law. 
Though it is a minority approach, certain states have adopted such a 
“totality of the circumstances” test.108
                                                                                                                                       
 104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-22(a) (2009). 
 105. Id. § 46-22(b).  
 106. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 108 S.E. 907, 908 (Ga. Ct. App. 1921);  Schnell v. 
Schnell, 346 N.W.2d 713, 716 (N.D. 1984) (“Sentimental reasons, particularly in the pre-
servation of a home, may also be considered, although they are subordinate to the pecu-
niary interests of the parties.”); Fike v. Sharer, 571 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Or. 1977) (“Oregon 
case law indicates that the financial interests of the owners is the primary factor to be con-
sidered for purposes of a determination of prejudice in the event of partition or sale.”); 
Zimmerman v. Marsh, 618 S.E.2d 898, 901 (S.C. 2005). 
 107. Idema v. Comstock, 110 N.W. 786, 787 (Wis. 1907). 
 108. See, e.g., Eli v. Eli, 557 N.W.2d 405, 410 (S.D. 1997) (courts must consider the “to-
tality of the circumstances,” including the ability of one or more of the parties to purchase 
the land at a partition sale, the parties’ sentimental attachment to the land, the location 
and size of the land, and the present and likely future uses of the land); Ark Land Co. v. 
Harper, 599 S.E.2d 754, 761 (W. Va. 2004) (“[T]he economic value of the property is not the 
exclusive test . . . Evidence of longstanding ownership, coupled with sentimental or emo-
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 Irrespective of whether it is good policy for courts to utilize an 
economics-only test in partition cases, if such a test is to be utilized, 
courts should conduct a proper economic analysis of the comparative 
economic benefits to the common owners of a partition in kind as op-
posed to a partition sale. However, many courts that have principally 
utilized economic analysis in deciding which remedy to order in a 
partition action have not been properly attentive to the different 
manner in which property should be valued if partitioned in kind 
versus sold at a partition sale. In estimating the value of the separate 
parcels that would result from a partition in kind, it is appropriate to 
consider the fair market value of these parcels as the prospective 
owners of these properties would then be able to later sell these par-
cels under market value conditions. However, in order to estimate 
the value of the property if sold as a whole, one must take into ac-
count the type of sale conditions under which the property would be 
sold. As indicated in the previous part of this Article, partition sales 
are almost never conducted under fair market value conditions. 
 In fact, in many partition actions, one or more of the common 
owners often seek to acquire the property at the public auction specif-
ically because they recognize a partition sale is a forced sale and the 
property will likely be sold below, often well below, its fair market 
value. To this end, in one Delaware case, two of the common owners 
of a family farm sought to halt a partition sale because the other 
common owners had disseminated information about the sale in a 
manner that exceeded the limited advertising required by state sta-
tute and court order.109 Such enhanced advertising jeopardized the 
plans the two common owners had of acquiring the family farm at a 
significant discount from its full market value.110 In other cases, real 
estate speculators have purchased small interests in tenancy in 
common property with the specific motive of seeking a forced parti-
tion sale so they can purchase the property at a significant discount 
from market value and in some cases at fire sale prices.111
 Although some courts do appear to understand a partition sale is 
a forced sale,112 many other courts in partition actions seem to simply 
                                                                                                                                       
tional interests in the property, may also be considered in deciding whether the interests of 
the party opposing the sale will be prejudiced by the property’s sale.”). 
 109. Plouffe v. Hastings, No. C.M. 3069 G-198, 2000 WL 1521471, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
29, 2000). Although the court did permit advertising in excess of the minimum required by 
the statute and court order, it appears that the partition sale that was to be conducted in 
this case still lacked the attributes of a market value sale. Despite this fact, the court indi-
cated that increased advertising could attract more bidders which would “increase the pos-
sibility that the full market value for the property will be paid.” Id. at *3. 
 110. Id. at *2. 
111. See Mitchell, supra note 100, at 579. 
 112. Schwartz v. Shapiro, 40 Cal. Rptr. 189, 202 (Ct. App. 1964) (“The [partition] sale is a 
‘forced sale’ in the same sense as would be a mortgage foreclosure, a trustee’s sale or a sale 
under execution.”). See also Orgain v. Butler, 496 S.E.2d 433, 435 (Va. 1998) (reversing chan-
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assume “the estate in common is assumed to realize fair market val-
ue. . . .”113 In one recent New York partition case that applied the 
“great prejudice” standard to determine whether a partition sale 
should be ordered despite New York’s statutory preference for a par-
tition in kind, the court utilized an economics-only test to decide 
whether it would order a partition in kind or a partition sale of com-
mercial property in Brooklyn.114 The court analyzed “whether the ag-
gregate value of the several parts when held by different individuals 
in severalty would be materially less than the whole value of the 
property if owned by one person.”115 According to the party who 
sought to resist a partition sale, the value of the parcel in its undi-
vided state was $77 million and the aggregate value of the parcels re-
sulting from a division in kind was $75.8 million.116 Though the court 
ended up ordering a partition sale, there was no indication the court 
evaluated the value of the whole property based upon its forced sale 
value. Similarly, in a North Carolina partition case, the court also 
used an economics-only test in which it compared the fair market 
value of the entire property with the fair market value of the two 
parcels resulting from a division in kind.117 Although in this case the 
court determined the $2100 diminution in value resulting from a di-
vision in kind was insufficient for the court to order a partition sale, 
the court seemed to assume, without a basis for doing so, that the 
property would sell for the fair market value of $280,000 at a forced 
partition sale.118
 The overly optimistic economic analysis many courts utilize in de-
ciding whether to order a partition in kind or a partition sale is stri-
kingly different from the type of economic analysis often used when a 
partition sale has been challenged ex post on the basis of a low sales 
price. Although many courts appear to assume a partition sale should 
yield a market value price when they are deciding whether to order a 
partition sale in the first instance, many other courts quite clearly 
realize a partition sale is a forced sale when they consider arguments 
one or more of the parties make to nullify a partition sale after it has 
been conducted. To this end, one court has stated the following: 
A partition sale is a forced sale, and for that reason courts have 
been hesitant to find that a bid substantially below an appraised 
value or an arm’s length transaction value is so grossly inadequate 
                                                                                                                                       
cellor’s order that property be sold at a public auction because the property would yield a 
much better price if it were offered for sale on the open market by a real estate broker). 
 113. Drachenberg v. Drachenberg, 58 A.2d 861, 865 (N.J. 1948). 
 114. Snyder Fulton St., L.L.C. v. Fulton Interest, L.L.C., 868 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2008). 
115. Id. (quoting Partrick v. Preiser, 341 N.Y.S.2d 806, 808 (N.Y. 1972)).  
 116. Id.
 117. Phillips v. Phillips, 246 S.E.2d 41, 44 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978). 
 118. Id. at 43-44. 
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to shock the conscience. Bids often amounting to only 50% or less 
of the appraised or arm’s length value have been upheld.119
Other courts have indicated that to test for adequacy of the sales 
price of a partition sale, one must compare the price the property sold 
for at the partition sale with the price one could expect at a fairly 
conducted forced sale and not with the price one might expect at a 
sale conducted under market value conditions.120 Some courts have 
even scolded parties who challenge the confirmation of a partition 
sale in which the property is sold at a public auction based upon the 
claim that the sales price was unreasonably low. For example, one 
court has stated that “[t]hose who stand by and permit a partition 
proceeding to culminate in a public sale of the property can reasona-
bly expect the property to be sold, in many cases, for less than its 
maximum market value.”121 In fact, many tenants in common in par-
tition actions do not merely stand by passively while a court orders a 
partition sale but instead vigorously fight to prevent a court from or-
dering a partition sale because they are very aware that such a sale 
could have devastating economic consequences. 
B.   Legal Scholars Have Overlooked the Wealth Impacts of Partition 
Sales 
 Hardly any legal scholars have considered the economic valuation 
issues involved in a partition sale in any depth. Some of those who 
support a preference for the partition sale believe wealth is maximized 
under a partition sale but not under a partition in kind because the 
property in its undivided state often has scale economies the market 
values.122 Thomas J. Miceli and C.F. Sirmans, for example, assume the 
fundamental trade-off “is between the benefits of preserving the op-
timal scale of the parcel under forced sale and the protection of subjec-
tive value under partition in kind.”123 Further, they claim a partition 
sale “subjects nonconsenting owners to a forced sale, thereby depriving 
them of any value that they attach to the land in excess of its market 
                                                                                                                                       
 119. Smith v. Rusmisell, 517 S.E.2d 494, 498 (W. Va. 1999) (quoting Koay v. Koay, 359 
S.E.2d 113, 116 (W. Va. 1987)). Some courts that have decided whether a partition sale 
should be set aside based upon the claimed inadequacy of the sales price have specifically 
identified some of the reasons that a partition sale fails to meet the test for a sale under 
fair market value conditions. For example, one court in Delaware noted that the property 
sold at the partition sale in question is typically purchased by people who finance their 
purchase of real property over some extended term as opposed to on the basis of a cash sale 
that the court mandated in that case. Gray v. Gray, No. G-49-77, 1977 WL 176257, at *1 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 23, 1977). 
 120. Koester v. Koester, 543 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
 121. Gray, 1977 WL 176257 at *1. 
 122. Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, Partition of Real Estate; Or Breaking Up Is 
(Not) Hard To Do, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 783, 789 (2000). 
 123. Id. at 784. 
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value.”124 This type of economic analysis is incorrect because it fails to 
take into account that a partition sale is a forced sale that could leave 
the cotenants stripped of significant wealth. Other commentators who 
have also utilized law and economics analysis to argue partition sales 
should be ordered more frequently have also incorrectly assumed that 
partition sales are typically conducted under open market conditions 
that yield fair market value prices.125
 In contrast, legal scholars primarily concerned with land loss in 
poor and minority communities have published law review articles 
arguing quite vigorously that courts should maintain the property 
rule protection traditionally afforded tenants in common with respect 
to the remedy of partition. These scholars believe by upholding the 
traditional preference for the partition in kind remedy, courts can 
vindicate a property owner’s noneconomic interests in his or her 
property. These noneconomic interests include liberty, dignity, citi-
zenship, security, psychological well-being, and political participa-
tion.126 However, most of those who argue tenants in common should 
be granted greater legal protections and greater stability of owner-
ship over time either have failed to address or challenge the assump-
tion made by certain law-and-economics scholars that partition sales 
are wealth-maximizing, or they have addressed such wealth-
maximizing claims in a tentative way by claiming that some partition 
sales may yield prices below market value.127
 Although most scholarship to date has failed to consider the likely 
negative wealth impacts resulting from partition sales, the likelihood 
of such wealth impacts comes into sharper relief when one considers 
                                                                                                                                       
 124. Id. (emphasis added). 
 125. See, e.g., Candace Reid, Note, Partitions in Kind: A Preference Without Favor, 7 
CARDOZO L. REV. 855, 878-79 (1986): 
[A] rule favoring sales in partition actions would promote efficiency by placing 
the property on the open market where co-owners opposing a sale or having a 
particular emotional attachment to the property would have an opportunity to 
retain possession by outbidding all comers. Therefore, the market price would 
reflect both the objective and subjective values of the property . . . .  
Under the principle of wealth maximization, when property is placed on the 
open market, courts are assured that the property will fetch the highest price 
possible and will end up in the hands of the party who values it the most.
 126. See, e.g., Craig-Taylor, supra note 103, at 766-69, 773-75; Chris Kelley, Stemming 
the Loss of Black Owned Farmland Through Partition Action—A Partial Solution, 1985 
ARK. L. NOTES 35, 36; Mitchell, supra note 100, at 535-42. 
 127. See Craig-Taylor, supra note 103, at 773 (stating that in partition sale cases, Afri-
can Americans “receive compensation that not only may fail to reflect the nonmarket value 
of the property lost but also may fail to accurately reflect fair market value”). A couple of 
authors do address the economic efficiency arguments more squarely. See Faith Rivers, In-
equity in Equity: The Tragedy of Tenancy in Common for Heirs’ Property Owners Facing 
Partition in Equity, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 58 (2007) (claiming, inter alia, 
that the typical partition sale “draws less than optimal market value because of the forced, 
timed conditions of the court sale”); Thomas W. Mitchell, Destabilizing the Normalization 
of Rural Black Land Loss: A Critical Role for Legal Empiricism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 557, 
585-97 (2005). 
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that financial and estate planning practitioners are well aware that 
partition sales are not “likely to command a fair market value 
price.”128 Therefore, these professionals typically advise their clients 
to structure their real property ownership in a way that contracts 
around the default rules governing exit from tenancies in common. 
For example, transactional attorneys play a key role in helping real 
estate investors who are interested in taking advantage of the tax-
deferred benefits provided by the rules set forth in I.R.C. § 1031129
governing “like-kind exchanges,” structure the ownership of their te-
nancy in common (TIC) property. 
 These transactional attorneys know full well that “permitting any 
TIC Owner to exercise its right of partition could be devastating to 
everyone’s investment.”130 To address this serious risk as well as oth-
er issues in a proactive way, leading practitioners consider a tenancy 
in common agreement (TIC agreement) to be the most important 
document for investors interested in this ownership structure.131
These TIC agreements can mitigate the potential economic harshness 
of a partition sale in many ways,132 including by requiring the inves-
tors to waive their right to partition. The Internal Revenue Service 
permits these types of waiver agreements in certain circumstances.133
 TIC agreements that include provisions limiting the unfettered 
rights of a tenant in common to seek a partition sale provide an ex-
ample of how, through private ordering, wealthier people with more 
social capital own their property under highly stable ownership 
structures or under a set of privately negotiated rules restricting the 
liquidation rights that a common owner might otherwise have under 
another ownership structure that may have default rules that make 
it quite unstable. Such restricted liquidation rights limit the likelih-
ood that wealthier people who own real property in common with 
others will suffer significant negative wealth impacts upon one of the 
                                                                                                                                       
 128. TERENCE MYERS, DORINDA DESCHERER & SIDNEY KESS, CCH FINANCIAL AND 
ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE 89 (2008). 
 129. I.R.C. § 1031 (2009). 
 130. ALVIN L. ARNOLD, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS—STRUCTURE AND ANALYSIS WITH 
FORMS § 2:103 (2006). 
 131. Ken Swenson & Mary L. Dickson, Common Ground: The Recent Trend Toward 
Financing Tenancies in Common Poses Substantial Challenges to Lenders, LOS ANGELES
LAWYER, September 2005, at 40, 43. Others have noted that “it is difficult to imagine a TIC 
arrangement that does not have such a co-ownership agreement.” Bradley T. Borden & W. 
Richey Wyatt, Syndicated Tenancy-in-Common Arrangements: How Tax-Motivated Real 
Estate Transactions Raise Serious Nontax Issues, PROB. & PROP., Sept./Oct. 2004, at 18, 20. 
 132. See generally Bradford Updike, Exploring the Frontier of Non-Traditional Real Es-
tate Investments: A Closer Look at 1031 Tenancy-in-Common Arrangements, 40 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 271, 340 (2007) (observing “a number of protections” are available to “help mitigate 
the harshness of this risk”). 
 133. Cheryl P. Armata, Financing Tenant in Common Projects: Tenant in Common 
Commercial Projects Have Risks for Lenders. But with Some Planning, Those Risks Can Be 
Managed, 22 NO. 5 PRAC. REAL EST. L. 17 (Sept. 2006).  
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common owner’s exit from the common ownership arrangement. In 
contrast, those whose human or economic capital is insufficient to 
engage in private ordering remain subject to the default rules that 
make tenancy in common ownership highly unstable and increase 
the likelihood the owners will lose wealth—perhaps substantial 
wealth—if a court orders a partition sale. 
C.   Partition Sales May Be Contributing to the Racial Wealth Gap 
 Just as many courts and legal scholars have overlooked the possi-
ble negative wealth impacts partition sales may generate, the exist-
ing scholarship on partition sales has not explored whether the race 
of the landowner is an important independent variable that may af-
fect sales price. In fact, the current legal regime governing partition 
actions may be contributing in a number of ways to the racial wealth 
gap between African Americans and white Americans. This wealth 
gap is substantial as the average black family possesses approx-
imately just one-tenth the wealth or assets of the average white fami-
ly.134 The partition rules may have a disparate impact upon African 
Americans to the extent a disproportionate percentage of African 
Americans own land under the default rules governing tenancies in 
common, which seems likely.135 If this is the case, African Americans 
would be more at risk of having their tenancy in common property 
sold at partition sales than white Americans who may tend to own 
their property under more stable ownership structures such as li-
mited liability companies, land trusts, or under TIC agreements 
which ensure stable ownership.136 In sum, if African Americans are 
overrepresented in the group of property owners who own tenancy in 
common property under the inherently unstable default rules, such a 
                                                                                                                                       
 134. See, e.g., LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARED BERNSTEIN & SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO, THE STATE 
OF WORKING AMERICA 2006/2007 258 (10th ed. 2007); see generally MELVIN L. OLIVER &
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL 
INEQUALITY (10th ed. 2006) (analyzing the many different facets of the wealth gap between 
black Americans and white Americans). 
 135. See THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, INC., THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY ON BLACK 
RURAL LAND TENURE IN THE SOUTHEASTERN REGION OF THE UNITED STATES 64, 475 (1984) 
(estimating that 41% of black-owned land in the southeastern states is owned under the 
default rules governing tenancies in common as ownership of this land has been trans-
ferred by intestacy). 
 136. In this way, a racialized pattern of tenancy in common ownership under the de-
fault rules would mirror the current foreclosure crisis in which African Americans and La-
tinos hold a disproportionate percentage of subprime mortgages, which are the mortgages 
that are being foreclosed upon at the highest rate. See SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 
23 (showing that 52% of African Americans receive higher-cost mortgages; 40% of Latinos 
receive higher-cost mortgages; and 19% of non-Latino whites receive higher-cost mortgag-
es). The lack of comparative data on white-owned rural property owned under the tenancy 
in common form of ownership makes it difficult to assess whether black landowners own 
more of their landholdings under the default rules governing tenancies in common than 
white landowners. 
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pattern of tenancy in common ownership could be contributing to the 
perpetuation of the racial wealth gap given that partition sales are 
often wealth-depleting. 
 It is also possible that of all the property owners who own proper-
ty under the default rules governing the partition of tenancy in com-
mon and joint tenancy property, African Americans and other minor-
ities may be targeted for forced partition sales in one way or another. 
For example, it is possible judges order partition sales in a higher 
percentage of partition cases involving African Americans than they 
do in partition cases involving whites. This would be consistent with 
the claims that many have made that eminent domain has been uti-
lized more heavily in minority neighborhoods than in white neigh-
borhoods under programs such as urban renewal.137 In addition, the 
media, including the Associated Press, has uncovered many shocking 
instances in which real estate speculators utilizing very sharp prac-
tices purchased very small interests in black-owned tenancy in com-
mon properties located in states throughout the South, properties 
that in many instances had been owned by certain African-American 
families for generations, and then were able to convince various state 
courts to order the property sold under a partition sale.138 There is no 
similar evidence in the media or otherwise of white landowners in 
any region of the country who own tenancy in common property being 
systematically targeted by real estate speculators seeking to force the 
sale of their property. 
 Race may be a causal factor in diminishing the sales price at a 
partition sale to the extent partition sales of black-owned property 
are conducted differently than partition sales of white-owned pro-
perty. For example, if public officials sell black-owned property subject  
to a partition sale under certain rigged conditions of one type or an-
other that are likely to suppress the sales price, but sell white-owned 
property at partition sales in compliance with the law, it is likely that 
black landowners would often receive even less than the normal 
forced sales price. Although there is no study that has evaluated 
whether public officials tend to sell black-owned property under ille-
gally rigged conditions more frequently than they sell white-owned 
                                                                                                                                       
 137. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 522 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
see also BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC: HOW AMERICA 
REBUILDS CITIES 28 (1989) (“Of all the families displaced by urban renewal from 1949 
through 1963, 63 percent of those whose race was known were nonwhite.”). In addition, it 
would be consistent with claims that minority farmers have made that the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture has been more willing to restructure loans for white farmers who fell 
behind in making loan payments as result of economic shocks than similarly-situated mi-
nority farmers who fell behind in making loan payments. See infra notes 348-55 and ac-
companying text. 
 138. See, e.g., Todd Lewan & Dolores Barclay, Quirk in Law Strips Blacks of Land,
TENNESSEAN, Dec. 11, 2001, at 8A. 
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property under such conditions, there is evidence in some places that 
officials have sold property subject to a forced sale under rigged con-
ditions.139
 Even if the same partition sale procedures are used irrespective of 
the race of the property owners, it may be the case that African 
Americans and other minorities are particularly susceptible to receiv-
ing prices below forced-sale value at partition sales. For example, the 
typical black property owner may not be as capable as the typical 
white property owner of bidding effectively at a partition sale in a 
thin market due to the fact that the average black family has much 
less wealth than the average white family140 and due to lending dis-
crimination. If black property owners are not as able to bid competi-
tively as white property owners when their property is subject to a 
partition sale, black-owned property may be selling for lower than 
expected prices at partition sales given the fact that one or more of 
the common owners are often among the small group of people who 
make bids at partition sales. 
IV.   COURTS IN OTHER CONTEXTS UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANT
DISTINCTION BETWEEN FORCED SALE VALUE AND MARKET VALUE 
 Though largely overlooked in the context of partition sales of real 
property, valuation is crucial in many areas of the law, like business 
organizations and partnership law,141 bankruptcy law,142 tax law,143
                                                                                                                                       
 139. For example, property has been sold under rigged condition in Bolivar County, 
Mississippi—at least according to the Bolivar County official we spoke to a few years back. 
Instead of selling property that was subject to a tax sale at a public auction, the property 
was offered to a limited number of real estate investment firms according to the county 
official we interviewed. According to this official, these real estate firms were offered the 
property on a rotating basis under which they made noncompetitive bids. Such an ar-
rangement would have violated Mississippi law that requires property subject to a tax sale 
to be sold at an auction. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-41-59 (West 2008). This statute states in 
relevant part that 
the tax collector shall proceed to sell, for the payment of taxes then remaining 
due and unpaid, together with all fees, penalties and damages provided by law, 
the land or so much and such parts of the land of each delinquent taxpayer to
the highest and best bidder for cash as will pay the amount of taxes due by him 
and all costs and charges. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Harold A. McDougall, Black Landowners Beware: A Proposal 
for Statutory Reform, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 127, 134 n.37 (1979-1980) (claiming 
that public officials have conspired with private parties to force the sale of black-owned, 
tenancy in common property). 
 140. See MISHEL ET AL., supra note 134, at 258. 
 141. See Susan Kalinka, Dissociation of a Member from a Louisiana Limited Liability 
Company: The Need for Reform, 66 LA. L. REV. 365, 388 (2006). 
 142. See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Ronit J. Berkovich, The Implications of the Third 
Circuit’s Armstrong Decision on Creative Corporate Restructuring: Will Strict Construction 
of the Absolute Priority Rule Make Chapter 11 Consensus Less Likely?, 55 AM. U. L. REV.
1345, 1350 (2006) (“Taking into account that bankruptcy reorganization is a zero-sum 
game, valuation is a critical factor for participation in the reorganization.”). 
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eminent domain,144 and foreclosure,145 for example. In these areas of 
law, there is often vigorous litigation about whether the property in 
question should be valued at its fair market value or its forced or li-
quidation value, or whether property to be sold at a forced sale 
should be sold under conditions more likely to yield prices that may 
approach fair market value prices. Litigants, judges, scholars, and 
others recognize that the manner in which these valuation issues are 
resolved is critical and that the manner in which value is determined 
can give rise to significant wealth transfers between the parties.146
 The legal scholarship and case law in many areas of law in which 
valuation is crucial has been dynamic and contested, reflecting an 
underlying disagreement about which factors and norms should be 
taken into account when determining value. We survey partnership 
dissolution cases and two specific areas of bankruptcy law to high-
light the critical distinction between valuing an asset at its fair mar-
ket value as opposed to valuing the same asset at its forced sale or li-
quidation value. This review makes it clear that it is highly unlikely 
forced sales—including partition sales—of property owned by low- to 
middle-income and minority property owners yield market value 
prices. In other words, forced sales of property owned by low- to mid-
dle-income and minority property owners are highly unlikely to con-
stitute a wealth-maximizing, sui generis category of forced sales. 
A.   Partnership Dissolution Cases: The Concern About “Fire Sales” 
 Partnership dissolution cases provide a particularly good com-
parative framework for evaluating the law of partition in the context 
                                                                                                                                       
 143. JOHN A. BOGDANSKI, FEDERAL TAX VALUATION ¶ 1.01[1] (2006). One court  
has stated: 
Disputes over valuation fill our dockets, and for good reason. We approximate 
that 243 sections of the Code require fair market value estimates in order to 
assess tax liability, and that 15 million tax returns are filed each year on which 
taxpayers report an event involving a valuation-related issue. It is no mystery, 
therefore, why valuation cases are ubiquitous. Today, valuation is a highly so-
phisticated process. 
Estate of Auker v. Comm’r, No. 13150-96, 1998 WL 248923, at *11 (T.C.M. (RIA) 
May 19, 1998). 
 144. Serkin, supra note 51, at 686 n.41. 
 145. See, e.g., Nelson & Whitman, supra note 60, at 1415-26. 
 146. See, e.g., Advanced Commc’n Design, Inc. v. Follett, 615 N.W.2d 285, 293 (Minn. 
2000). In Follett, the court stated as follows: 
[W]e conclude that a valuation of $475,381 for respondent’s one-third interest 
in ACD represents an unfair wealth transfer from the remaining shareholders 
to respondent because it places unrealistic financial demands on the corpora-
tion given the financial data presented in the majority report, and in all proba-
bility strips ACD of necessary cash flow and earnings for future growth. 
Id.
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of disputes involving real property owned under different concurrent 
ownership structures. A partnership and a tenancy in common are 
both undivided ownership structures under which two or more people 
own some asset collectively, whether the asset is in the form of per-
sonal or real property.147 Like other common ownership structures, 
the law provides individual owners with the unilateral right to exit 
both a partnership and a tenancy in common. In dealing with exit in 
both the context of partnerships and tenancies in common, courts 
must decide how to balance the interests of the individual who seeks 
to exit the ownership group and the interests of the remaining  
common owners. 
 In the context of partnership dissolution cases governed under ei-
ther the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA)148 or the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act (RUPA),149 courts have faced a very similar issue to 
the one judges in partition cases confront in deciding whether to or-
der a partition sale, a partition in kind, or some other remedy such as 
a buyout. In the partnership context, in cases in which certain events 
trigger a mandatory dissolution and winding up of the partnership,150
judges must decide between ordering a judicial sale of partnership 
assets, normally at a public auction, or ordering some other remedy 
such as an in-kind distribution of the physical assets of the partner-
ship or a mechanism permitting the remaining partners to buy out 
the interests of an exiting partner.151 In contrast to most state parti-
tion statutes containing an explicit preference for a partition in 
kind,152 most courts have resolved partnership dissolution cases un-
der the UPA based upon a plain language interpretation of the UPA, 
                                                                                                                                       
 147. In fact, prior to the promulgation of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, which 
explicitly adopted an entity theory of a partnership, the Uniform Partnership Act utilized 
the “tenancy-in-partnership” concept. Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing the Fundamental 
Premises of Partnership Taxation, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 229, 249-50 (1993). Some have de-
scribed the tenancy in partnership as a modified form of the tenancy in common. See, e.g.,
ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY § 5.1 (2d ed. 1993). 
 148. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914). 
 149. REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997). 
 150. Under the default rules of the UPA, the partnership constitutes a very unstable 
ownership structure as there are a number of events that can trigger an automatic dissolu-
tion of the partnership. Some of these events have been referred to as technical dissolu-
tions, and they include the death of any partner or the retirement of a partner. See
WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 372 (West Group 2001); Alan 
R. Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution–Causes, Consequences, and Cures 43 TEX. L. REV.
631, 636 (1965). For a comprehensive listing of the events that will cause the dissolution of 
a partnership under the UPA, see id. at 633-37. In contrast, the drafters of RUPA sought to 
move partnership law closer to the entity model of business organizations under which the 
stability and continuity of the business enterprise is favored as opposed to the aggregate 
theory that more strongly influenced the drafters of the UPA and under which the partner-
ship is viewed as being indistinguishable from the partners. See Rudnick, supra note 147, 
at 250, 258. 
 151. See generally Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385, 391-402 (Md. 1999) (discussing remedies).  
 152. Mitchell, supra note 100, at 513 n.40. 
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which has resulted in a rule tending to favor liquidation of the part-
nership assets and cash distribution of the sale proceeds absent some 
agreement to the contrary.153
 Under RUPA, almost all of the technical dissolutions that may oc-
cur under the UPA cannot occur. For example, RUPA now requires a 
majority of the partners in a partnership for a definite term or for a 
particular undertaking to consent to dissolution and the partnership 
to buy out the interest of the dissociated partner in other circums-
tances such as the death of a partner.154 Nevertheless, RUPA still 
permits an individual partner in a partnership at will to force a li-
quidation of the partnership in some circumstances.155
 Just as financial and estate planners counsel their clients that a 
partition sale of property owned under a tenancy in common is likely 
to yield prices below market value under the tenancy in common de-
fault rules,156 business counselors typically advise their clients that a 
dissolution of a partnership and the liquidation of the partnership 
assets at a public auction will often result in economic loss that in 
some cases can be ruinous.157 Due to this concern, clients who are 
well-advised often enter into agreements contracting around the de-
fault provisions of the UPA and RUPA,158 provisions that may other-
wise be deemed to require dissolution of the partnership and a 
winding up of the business in a manner that ends with a sale of the 
assets of the partnership at a public auction.159
 Leading business organizations scholars have claimed liquidation 
by public auction rarely occurs due to the prevalence of partnership 
agreements that, among other things, restrict the rights of any part-
ner to compel dissolution and winding up and the rights of partners 
during the winding up process to have distributions paid to them in 
cash under the default rules set forth in UPA section 38(1) or RUPA 
section 807(a).160 Through such private ordering, property owners 
                                                                                                                                       
 153. See Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890, 894 (Alaska 2004) (recognizing the general 
rule but noting the statute does not “absolutely compel liquidation”). Most leading business 
organizations scholars conceptualize winding up either under the UPA or under RUPA as 
also requiring liquidation. According to one leading business organizations scholar 
“[winding up] of a partnership is the practice of liquidating assets and discharging liabili-
ties following dissolution or disassociation if the partnership is to be terminated.” ROBERT
W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: UNINCORPORATED BUSINESSES AND CLOSELY 
HELD CORPORATIONS ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 452 (1996). 
 154. GREGORY, supra note 150, at 372.  
 155. Id.; see also RUPA § 801(1). 
 156. See MYERS, DESCHERER & KESS, supra note 128, at 89. 
 157. Bromberg, supra note 150, §§ 8.801, 807. 
 158. These agreements are commonly referred to as business-continuation agreements 
or simply as continuation agreements. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS 91 (4th ed. 2005). 
 159. Bromberg, supra note 150, at 668; see also GREGORY, supra note 150, at 369. 
 160. See Gregory, supra note 150, at 369-70; see also ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED 
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with sufficient economic resources and human capital own their 
property under more stable arrangements and are better positioned 
to fend off a request that one of their co-owners may make for a 
forced sale than otherwise similarly situated low- to middle-income 
and less wealthy property owners who often are not able to privately 
order their asset ownership for financial and other reasons. 
 In partnership dissolution cases governed under the default rules, 
disputes may arise if a partner seeks to liquidate a partnership based 
upon a claim that he or she possesses liquidation rights under certain 
provisions of either the UPA or RUPA. Two separate lines of cases 
have developed to resolve these types of partnership disputes. The 
dominant approach is exemplified by the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana’s decision in Pankratz Farms Inc. v. Pankratz.161 The court uti-
lized a plain language interpretation method which resulted in a rule 
making liquidation of partnership assets through a forced sale the 
only option upon dissolution.162 Under this approach, a court will or-
der a partnership liquidated at a public sale irrespective of whether 
there might be a substantially more wealth-maximizing way in which 
to dissolve and wind up the partnership. 
 However, courts in a number of other jurisdictions have expressed 
concern about “the unfairness and harshness of a compelled liquida-
tion.”163 Courts willing to seek alternatives to liquidating partnership 
assets through a forced sale have framed their concerns in primarily 
economic and wealth impact terms. One court referred to the forced 
sale option as a “fire sale.”164 Another court claimed that under the 
facts of the case it was deciding, “a forced sale of the partnership will 
destroy a great part of the value of the business”165 while another 
claimed more broadly that a “forced sale often results in economic 
waste” because such sales often end up dissipating the wealth of the 
common owners as a whole.166
 These forced sales can result in economic waste if the property is 
sold for a price below market value or, if the property is sold for mar-
ket value, as a result of transaction costs that may be higher in a 
forced sale than they would be if some other alternative to a liquida-
                                                                                                                                       
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (2001) 351, 359
(2008 ed.) (referring to the “standard practice of drafting around the [liquidation] right”). 
 161. 95 P.3d 671 (Mont. 2004). 
 162. Id. at 681. 
 163. Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385, 393 (Md. 1999). For this reason, courts in a number of 
states have been willing to consider alternatives to liquidation through forced sales in 
partnership dissolution cases. 
 164. Id.
 165. Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co., 144 A.2d 207, 219 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1958); see also HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§227-29 (1979). 
 166. Horne v. Aune, 121 P.3d 1227, 1233 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
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tion sale were ordered. In Disotell v. Stiltner,167 the Supreme Court of 
Alaska decided it was more appropriate to permit one partner to buy 
out the other partner’s partnership interest at fair market value 
upon dissolution than to order a forced sale of the partnership’s as-
sets. The court indicated a forced sale would likely result in an unne-
cessary dissipation of the partners’ wealth and detailed the benefits 
of the buyout option: 
The superior court reasoned that a buyout would reduce economic 
waste by avoiding the cost of appointing a receiver and conducting a 
sale. Even though there was no ongoing business, the superior court 
noted that the expense of a sale could total as much as twelve per-
cent of the property’s value. This was a valid reason and potentially 
benefited both partners. The potential savings were significant. The 
court’s effort to avoid further loss to both partners justifies its deci-
sion to offer Stiltner the buyout option. Further, properly conducted, 
a buyout guaranteed Disotell a fair value for his partnership inter-
est. Liquidation exposed Disotell to the risk that no buyer would of-
fer to pay fair market value for the property.168
In Creel v. Lilly,169 Maryland’s highest court decided whether the 
partnership assets of Joe’s Racing, a partnership, were required to be 
liquidated upon winding up of the partnership after one of the part-
ners died, as the estate of the deceased partner insisted.170 Although 
Maryland adopted RUPA on June 1, 1998, during a five-year phase-
in period, the UPA was still in effect for partnerships like Joe’s Rac-
ing that were formed before Maryland adopted RUPA.171 The Creel
court held that the lower court’s determination that the partnership 
agreement did not require liquidation was in conformity with the 
UPA.172 Moreover, the Creel court noted liquidation for many small 
businesses such as Joe’s Racing can be a “harmful and destructive 
measure.”173 Based upon this concern, the court held neither the UPA 
nor RUPA required a forced sale of the partnership assets upon dis-
solution in order to ascertain the true value of the business even if 
the partnership agreement is silent on the manner of dissolution and 
winding up of the partnership.174
 The same economic issues that have encouraged many courts in 
partnership dissolution cases to seek judicial alternatives to the 
forced sale of partnership assets are present in the context of parti-
tion sale cases. In other words, it is the forced sale remedy and not 
                                                                                                                                       
 167. 100 P.3d 890 (Alaska 2004). 
 168. Id. at 894. 
 169. 729 A.2d 385. 
 170. Id. at 387. 
 171. Id. at 393. 
 172. Id. at 388. 
 173. Id. at 400. 
 174. Id. at 399. 
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the form of ownership that can be the source of economic waste. For 
example, in a recent case, Steven Aune and Cecilia Horne purchased 
property together in 2002 in Gig Harbor, Washington, as tenants in 
common.175 A few months later they converted their ownership of the 
property from a tenancy in common into a partnership governed un-
der RUPA, as Washington adopted RUPA in 1998.176 Both parties 
ended up agreeing the partnership should be dissolved and wound 
up,177 but disagreed on whether the court was obligated to order a 
public sale of the partnership property.178 As a case of first impres-
sion in Washington, the court chose to follow Creel and affirmed the 
trial court’s decision to permit Horne to buy out Aune’s partnership 
interest for $50,000, representing 50% of the equity the partnership 
had built up in the property.179
 The very same concerns about economic waste and adverse wealth 
impacts would have been present had the litigants in Horne opted to 
maintain their ownership under a tenancy in common and had one of 
them later initiated a partition action requesting a partition sale. De-
spite significant differences in the rules governing these ownership 
forms, a tenancy in common and a partnership have many similar 
features, including the type of remedies that are theoretically availa-
ble to a common owner upon exit. Therefore, it is striking that the 
economic waste issues many legal commentators and judges squarely 
address in the context of partnership dissolution cases—albeit in 
ways that reach different conclusions—have only rarely been ad-
dressed head on in scholarship or judicial opinions addressing the 
partition remedy in the real property context. 
B.   Bankruptcy: Pitched Battles over Establishing the Valuation 
Standard 
 In bankruptcy law, asset valuation is pervasive in any number of 
contexts, and it plays an important and oftentimes dispositive role.180
Bankruptcy courts have developed and utilized a large number of as-
set valuation theories, perhaps because the Bankruptcy Code con-
tains provisions that invite case-by-case valuation analysis.181 For ex-
ample, 11 U.S.C. § 506(a),182 a very important provision in many 
bankruptcy proceedings, addresses the valuation of a creditor’s colla-
teral for purposes of determining the extent to which the creditor’s 
                                                                                                                                       
 175. Horne v. Aune, 121 P.3d 1227, 1228 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
 176. Id. at 1228-31. 
 177. Id. at 1229-30. 
 178. Id. at 1231. 
 179. Id. at 1230, 1233-34. 
 180. Lawless & Ferris, supra note 22, at 3, 7-11. 
 181. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 28, at 64 (1991) (noting that bankruptcy courts have 
developed an “extremely diverse and contradictory set of valuation theories”). 
 182. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006). 
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claim is secured as opposed to unsecured. This section states “value 
shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the 
proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with 
any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such 
creditor’s interest.”183
 As a threshold matter, bankruptcy courts often decide the legal 
standard that will be used to measure value and these legal stan-
dards include liquidation value, going-concern value, and replace-
ment value.184 There is a dramatic difference between valuing an as-
set according to its liquidation value and valuing the same asset ac-
cording to its replacement value. One commentator has described the 
meaning of liquidation value in the bankruptcy context as follows: 
Liquidation value is usually taken to imply what the creditor could 
realize in a forced sale under the rules of U.C.C. article 9, real es-
tate mortgage provisions, or, even worse, under the rules of judi-
cial execution. Such sales are notoriously poor in producing cash 
proceeds, and, if hypothetical liquidation is the standard, a court 
could easily justify a low figure by way of value.185
Going-concern value has been defined “as the price a buyer would 
pay for an asset when sold as part of the business as a whole.”186 The 
Supreme Court has defined replacement value in the context of 
bankruptcy essentially as fair market value. In Associates Commer-
cial Corp. v. Rash,187 the Supreme Court defined replacement value 
as “the price a willing buyer in the debtor’s trade, business, or situa-
tion would pay to obtain like property from a willing seller.”188 After 
the legal standard is determined in many bankruptcy proceedings, 
the evidence about the specific characteristics of the asset in question 
is considered in the light of the applicable legal valuation standard to 
arrive at a valuation figure.189
 Bankruptcy law incentivizes debtors and creditors to stake out 
very different and sometimes shifting positions with respect to valua-
tion.190 Oftentimes, the debtor attempts to convince the bankruptcy 
court to establish a low value for a particular asset and the creditor 
asks the court to establish a much higher value for the same asset. In 
                                                                                                                                       
 183.  Id.
 184. Lawless & Ferris, supra note 22, at 1, 11. 
 185. Carlson, supra note 28, at 75. 
 186. Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 1061, 1092 (1985). 
 187. 520 U.S. 953 (1997). 
 188. Id. at 960. 
 189. See, e.g., In re De Anda-Ramirez, 359 B.R. 794, 797 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) (de-
scribing a case in which the parties valuing an automobile in a Chapter 13 cramdown pro-
ceeding under the replacement value standard disagreed about whether the Kelly Blue 
Book retail value estimate or the Kelly Blue Book private party value estimate was  
most germane). 
 190. Carlson, supra note 28, at 85. 
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other instances, for example in a proceeding in which the creditor 
seeks to lift an automatic stay of all creditor actions against the deb-
tor outside of the bankruptcy court, it is the creditor who often ar-
gues its interest is not adequately secured because the collateral in 
question has a relatively low value based upon the asset’s liquidation 
value.191 Sometimes a debtor or a creditor will argue for different val-
uations of some asset in the course of the very same bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, for example arguing for the liquidation value of a particular 
asset in one context and the going-concern value for the very same 
asset in another context.192
 The fierce contest by parties in bankruptcy proceedings over es-
tablishing the proper valuation standard in the first instance rein-
forces the point that there is a substantial difference between an as-
set’s fair market value and its liquidation or forced sale value. Chap-
ter 13 “cram down” proceedings and cases that implicate Section 548 
of the Bankruptcy Code provide two good examples of how important 
it can be whether an asset is valued at its fair market value or its 
forced sale value. 
1.   Chapter 13 “Cram Down” Proceedings 
 Valuation battles in bankruptcy proceedings, like valuation bat-
tles in other contexts, are not just academic. Their resolution can 
significantly shift economic burdens between debtors and creditors. A 
Chapter 13 “cram down” proceeding provides one good example of the 
central role valuation can play in bankruptcy proceedings. In a “cram 
down” proceeding, the debtor may keep the collateral at issue over 
the objection of the creditor, while the creditor retains the lien over 
the collateral to secure payment. The creditor is also entitled to be 
paid the present value of the collateral over the term of the reorgani-
zation plan.193 The manner in which courts resolve the valuation is-
sues arising in Chapter 13 “cram down” proceedings can mean the 
difference between a debtor staying in business under a court-
                                                                                                                                       
 191. See, e.g., In re Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 2 (Bankr. D. Mass 1990) (involving creditor 
who sought to remove automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(1) in order to foreclose his 
second mortgage interest on the debtor’s investment property). 
 192. Carlson, supra note 28, at 85-86. However, some courts resist the attempts of ei-
ther a debtor or a creditor to argue for a different valuation standard at some later point in 
a bankruptcy proceeding. In a well known case, one court stated the following: 
Having declared itself a fish to be reorganized, it would be inconsistent for the 
court now to permit the Debtor to declare itself a fowl to be liquidated for pur-
poses of “cramming down” a lower “appraised” value upon the secured Credi-
tors. Therefore, a liquidation value, i.e., a foreclosure value, is a procedure to-
tally foreign to this matter and not a proper standard for valuation. 
In re Pine Gate Assocs., No. B75-4345A, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17366 (N.D. Ga. Oct.  
14, 1977). 
 193. See, e.g., Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 957 (1997). 
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approved reorganization plan under which debt schedules are re-
structured or the debtor being immediately forced to liquidate his or 
her assets. 
 In Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, the debtors who filed for 
reorganization under Chapter 13 sought to keep a truck for use in 
generating a future stream of income in their freight-hauling busi-
ness.194 Associates Commercial Corp., the creditor, argued the truck 
should be valued at $41,000 based upon a replacement-value stan-
dard, while the debtors argued the truck should be valued at $31,875
based upon a foreclosure-value standard.195 Obviously, a higher valu-
ation amount would benefit a creditor in a cram down proceeding—
including a creditor who might be under-secured—and a lower valua-
tion amount would minimize the amount of money the debtor would 
be required to pay the creditor during the reorganization term there-
by helping the debtor generate more unencumbered income while 
under reorganization.196 In evaluating which legal standard to em-
ploy, the court noted the use of the foreclosure-value standard typi-
cally yields values lower than the replacement-value or fair-market-
value standard as was the case in Rash.197 Ultimately, the Rash
Court held the replacement-value standard was the appropriate 
standard to use when valuing an asset the debtor seeks to use during 
reorganization in a Chapter 13 cram down case.198
2.   Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code 
 In 1994, in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,199 the Supreme Court 
decided a bankruptcy case in which the debtor in possession sought 
to set aside the conveyance of property sold for $433,000 at a noncol-
lusive real estate foreclosure sale that occurred a few months before 
the debtor filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.200 The debtor in 
possession claimed the property had a fair market value of $725,000 
at the time of the foreclosure sale and that the sales price constituted 
a fraudulent conveyance under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.201 Under Section 548, not only may property transfers be set 
aside if there is evidence of actual fraud, but transfers in which con-
                                                                                                                                       
 194. Id. at 956-57. 
 195. In Rash, the Supreme Court defined replacement value as “the price a willing 
buyer in the debtor’s trade, business, or situation would pay a willing seller to obtain prop-
erty of like age and condition” and indicated that its definition of replacement value was 
consistent with the definition of fair market value that the Ninth Circuit articulated in In 
re Taffi, 96 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 1996).  Rash, 520 U.S. at 959 n.2. 
 196. See id. at 953. 
 197. Id. at 960. 
 198. Id.
 199. 511 U.S. 531 (1994). 
 200. Id. at 534. 
 201. Id.
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structive fraud is established may also be set aside.202 The debtor’s 
claim for constructive fraud hinged upon whether the foreclosure sale 
price, a price allegedly constituting 60% of the fair market value of 
the property at the time of the foreclosure sale, represented “less 
than a reasonably equivalent value” for the property.203
 In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s opinion and resolving a split in 
the federal courts of appeals,204 the Supreme Court in BFP indicated 
that the term “fair market value” is not found in Section 548, in con-
trast to its inclusion in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.205
More broadly, the Court considered the “reasonable equivalent value” 
standard in the light of the economic conditions under which proper-
ty is sold at a typical foreclosure sale, concluding “ ‘fair market value’ 
presumes market conditions that, by definition, simply do not obtain 
in the context of a forced sale.”206 The Court then made clear some of 
the ways in which a sale under a willing seller-willing buyer para-
digm differs from a sale under foreclosure sale conditions. Writing for 
the Court, Justice Scalia stated as follows: 
An appraiser’s reconstruction of “fair market value” could show 
what similar property would be worth if it did not have to be sold 
within the time and manner strictures of state-prescribed foreclo-
sure. But property that must be sold within those strictures is 
simply worth less. No one would pay as much to own such property 
as he would pay to own real estate that could be sold at leisure and 
pursuant to normal marketing techniques. And it is no more rea-
listic to ignore that characteristic of the property (the fact that 
state foreclosure law permits the mortgagee to sell it at forced 
sale) than it is to ignore other price-affecting characteristics (such 
as the fact that state zoning law permits the owner of the neigh-
boring lot to open a gas station). Absent a clear statutory require-
ment to the contrary, we must assume the validity of this state-
                                                                                                                                       
 202. Id. at 535. 
 203. Id.
 204. To this end, in 1980, the Fifth Circuit held in Durrett v. Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. 
that a debtor in possession was entitled to set aside as a fraudulent conveyance—under a 
provision of the prior Bankruptcy Act that was analogous to Section 548—a real estate 
transfer in which the property in question was sold for 58% of its fair market value at a fo-
reclosure sale conducted nine days before the Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition was filed. 
621 F.2d 201, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1980). In dicta, the court in Durrett further indicated that 
any sale for less than 70% of fair market value should be set aside as not satisfying the 
reasonable equivalent value standard, provided that all of the other elements of the frau-
dulent conveyance provision were satisfied. See id. at 203. In contrast to Durrett and its 
progeny, courts of appeal in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits had held that the consideration 
received in a noncollusive foreclosure sale conducted in accordance with a state’s foreclo-
sure laws constitutes a reasonable equivalent value under Section 548 irrespective of 
whether the consideration represents an amount substantially below the fair market value 
of the property. BFP, 511 U.S. at 536. 
 205. BFP, 511 U.S. at 537. 
 206. Id. at 538. 
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law regulatory background and take due account of its effect.207
Though Justice Scalia’s assertion that property sold under foreclo-
sure sale conditions is “worth less”208 may be technically inaccurate in 
economic terms,209 one can expect a higher sales price to be fetched 
for an asset if it is marketed under fair market value conditions as 
opposed to forced sale conditions. 
 Overall, the partnership dissolution examples and bankruptcy ex-
amples make it clear that, in many areas of the law, judges, academ-
ics, and practicing attorneys fully understand that an asset’s forced 
sale value is quite different from the asset’s fair market value. Prop-
erty sold under forced sale conditions should normally sell for less 
than the property’s fair market value, thereby reducing a property 
owner’s wealth upon finalization of the sale, sometimes substantially. 
As a result, valuation disputes generate a great deal of litigation in 
many different legal contexts. Serious concerns about the wealth-
depleting impact of forced sales also motivates many people who have 
sufficient means and who are well-advised by transactional attorneys 
to structure their property ownership ex ante in such a way as to mi-
nimize the chances that a forced sale of their property could occur 
down the road. 
V.   EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF FORCED SALES AND RESALES OF 
“FORECLOSURE-STATUS” PROPERTY
 Very few law review articles in the area of property law have un-
dertaken an empirical analysis of any of the types of legal processes 
that permit the forced sale of real property to test whether such sales 
have any impact on the wealth of the property owner. For example, 
empirical scholarship on many types of forced sales of real property, 
such as partition sales and tax sales, is practically nonexistent 
whether in law reviews or in other scholarly publications.210 The en-
suing discussion reviews empirical literature assessing the compen-
sation paid for properties obtained in the context of eminent domain 
and the prices paid for foreclosed and “foreclosure-status” properties. 
A.   Just Compensation in Eminent Domain 
 More so than in almost any other forced-sale context, one could 
reasonably expect property owners in eminent domain cases to be 
                                                                                                                                       
 207. Id. at 539. 
 208. Id.
 209. Lawless & Ferris, supra note 22, at 5, 19-22. 
 210. Few empirical articles have been published in law reviews that address any of the 
myriad of issues involved in the field of real estate transactions and real estate finance. 
One of these published empirical articles, an article published by a practitioner, has ad-
dressed racial discrimination in residential property tax assessments. See Harris, supra 
note 8, at 1. 
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paid the market value for their property upon its condemnation. In 
fact, it appears many property owners and legal scholars have simply 
assumed fair market value is paid when property is taken under 
eminent domain. As a result, legal scholars have paid far more atten-
tion to other aspects of an eminent domain proceeding, such as 
whether those vested with eminent domain power use it properly by, 
among other requirements, only condemning property for a valid 
public use. 
1.   Property Owners Entitled to Fair Market Value Compensation 
 Compared to the default rules of almost every other legal process 
authorizing real property to be sold against the wishes of the proper-
ty owner, the law of eminent domain provides a property owner with 
very strong legal rights with respect to the minimum compensation 
that must be paid to the property owner upon the extinguishment of 
his or her property rights. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution provides that private property may not be taken for public use 
without the payment of just compensation to the property owner.211
Further, in almost every instance, the Supreme Court has deter-
mined “just compensation” entitles the property owner to receive the 
fair market value for his or her property upon its being taken.212
 The Supreme Court has stated that the fair market valuation 
compensation standard represents an objective standard.213 Never-
theless, under the Supreme Court’s interpretation, property owners 
are not required to be compensated for a range of economic and non-
economic losses they may likely experience.214 These losses can in-
clude consequential damages such as relocation costs and loss of 
goodwill, as well as noneconomic damages that may result from the 
taking due to the property owner’s subjective emotional attachment 
to his or her property or community.215
                                                                                                                                       
 211. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.”). 
 212. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 (1984). Courts have deviated 
from the fair market value standard of compensation in two discrete circumstances: when 
it is too difficult to determine market value or when it has been determined that applying 
the market value standard would result in manifest injustice to the condemnee or to the 
public. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). 
 213. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979). 
 214. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (“[L]oss to the 
owner of non-transferable values deriving from his unique need for property or idiosyncrat-
ic attachment to it, like loss due to an exercise of police power is properly treated as part of 
the burden of common citizenship.”).  
 215. See John Fee, Reforming Eminent Domain, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE:
KELO IN CONTEXT 125, 133 (Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Massaron Ross eds., 2006). 
Though not required under Supreme Court precedent to compensate for economic or none-
conomic losses in excess of the fair market value of the condemned property, some jurisdic- 
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 There are many commentators who argue the law of eminent do-
main should be reformed in such a way that property owners would 
not be restricted to receiving the fair market value for their property 
if these property owners have suffered additional economic or non-
economic losses.216 Some of these commentators have argued property 
owners should be able to receive full compensation for all of their 
losses in an eminent domain case, as opposed to the incomplete com-
pensation many property owners now receive under the current 
law.217 Other scholars are concerned that minorities have often lost 
both their homes and their status as homeowners when their proper-
ty has been taken under eminent domain because the compensation 
these property owners have received has often proven insufficient for 
these owners to purchase comparable housing nearby as their neigh-
borhoods undergo gentrification. To remedy this problem, these scho-
lars have argued that property homeowners should receive “status 
preserving compensation” that may exceed the fair market value of 
their condemned property in order that these condemnees may be 
able to actually purchase comparable housing within the vicinity of 
their former homes.218 All these calls for reform assume property 
owners in eminent domain cases are in fact paid the fair market val-
ue for their property consistent with the Supreme Court’s articula-
tion of the just compensation requirement, but that  such fair market 
value compensation often fails in predictable ways to make the prop-
erty owner whole. As a threshold matter, however, one must question 
whether property owners in eminent domain actions do in fact tend 
to receive fair market value compensation when their property is 
taken for a public use as the law mandates and as many have as-
sumed does occur in most cases. 
2.   Many Condemnees Receive Less than Fair Market Value 
 Very few academics or researchers have conducted empirical stu-
dies to assess whether property owners have received fair market 
value compensation when their property has been taken under emi-
nent domain. Even fewer law professors have conducted such empiri-
cal studies. The most substantial of the studies conducted by law pro-
fessors was conducted by Curtis Berger and Patrick Rohan, who ana-
                                                                                                                                       
tions do provide that a property owner may be entitled to compensation in excess of the fair 
market value of his or her property that is taken. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-13 (2010)
(entitling condemnee to recover, inter alia, reasonable relocation expenses and payment for 
economic losses of tangible personal property). 
 216. See Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46 
S.C. L. REV. 579, 580 nn.7-8 (1995); Fee, supra note 215, at 134. 
 217. See Fee, supra note 215, at 134. 
 218. Rachel D. Godsil & David Simunovich, Just Compensation in an Ownership Socie-
ty, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND EMINENT DOMAIN 133, 135,  
147 (2008). 
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lyzed the condemnation practices of county officials in Nassau Coun-
ty, New York during the early 1960s.219
 An overwhelming percentage of the cases in Berger and Rohan’s 
study ended in a settlement agreement as opposed to an award at the 
end of a trial.220 The settlement agreements, viewed in the aggregate, 
reveal that the County negotiated with individual property owners—
the majority of whom were not represented by an attorney—in a way 
that resulted in most of the property owners receiving less than fair 
market value for their property.221 In fact, just 15.7% of the condem-
nees who settled received compensation equal to or better than the 
lowest County appraisal figure, and 56.9% received compensation 
under 90% of the County’s low appraisal.222 The fact that 8.6% of con-
demnees settled for less than 50% of the County’s lowest appraisal 
and that 16.9% received compensation between 50% and 69% of the 
County’s lowest appraisal provides evidence of the shocking, lowball 
negotiating tactics that some of the County negotiators employed.223
More broadly, in 29.3% of the settled cases, the condemnees received 
69% or less of the mean appraised value of the properties in those 
cases in which more than one appraisal was prepared.224
 Berger and Rohan posit that so many claims were settled below 
the County’s lowest appraisal based upon a combination of the Coun-
ty’s deceptively hardnosed negotiating strategy and the fact that 
many property owners either lacked knowledge about their property’s 
value or were under emotional and financial duress as a result of the 
eminent domain process.225 Negotiations would begin between the 
                                                                                                                                       
 219. Curtis J. Berger & Patrick J. Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical 
Look Into the Practices of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1967). 
 220. Id. at 440-41. In fact, trials only approached settlement agreements as the most 
frequent method of disposition for the properties in the data set that ended up yielding the 
highest compensation amounts. Id. This suggests that wealthier property owners not only 
better understood the relative value of settlement versus litigation in terms of just com-
pensation valuation, but also that wealthier property owners were better able to afford the 
costs of litigating such cases through trial. 
 221. Id. at 451. A number of the condemnees who did hire attorneys did so only after 
an agreement on the sales price already had been negotiated, thereby limiting the attorney 
to working on matters related to the closing and to satisfying any objections to the state of 
the title. Id. at 454. 
 222. Id. at 442-43. 
 223. Id. at 443. 
 224. Id. at 442. 
 225. Id. at 444-47; see also Gideon Kanner, “[Un]equal Justice Under Law”: The Invid-
iously Disparate Treatment of American Property Owners in Takings Cases, 40 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1065, 1104-05 (2007). Berger and Rohan note some of the practices the County used 
that may have had the impact of partially disarming the condemnee when price negotia-
tions began. For example, the first interaction between the condemnee and the negotiator 
often occurred when the condemnee contacted the negotiator after receiving a pamphlet 
from the County entitled “How Your County Acquires Land for Public Purposes,” a pam-
phlet that did not advise the condemnee to obtain his or her own appraisal. Berger & Ro-
han, supra note 219, at 444, 445 n.35. The negotiator would then seek to assist the con-
demnee in completing the proof of title form completed before any negotiation on price be-
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County and the condemnee some time after the first appraisal had 
been conducted. The County utilized low-paid county negotiators in 
all the proceedings, and these negotiators were given strict con-
straints on the amount of compensation they were authorized to offer 
the condemnee.226 The authors were told the ceiling on the amount 
the negotiators could offer was between 60% and 85% of the ap-
praised value; in contrast, there was no minimum amount set on how 
much the negotiator had to offer a condemnee.227
 Berger and Rohan’s study revealed that a condemnee’s likelihood 
of receiving fair market value as established by the County’s ap-
praisal alone—a determination of market value those who practice in 
the area of eminent domain on behalf of condemnees would reject 
forcefully—depended heavily upon whether the cases were settled or 
whether a judge or jury established compensation at the conclusion of 
litigation. In cases that were settled, the condemnee received an 
amount that was below the lowest appraisal in 84.4% of the settle-
ments; in 88.8% of the settlements, the condemnee received less than 
the mean appraisal in those cases in which two appraisals were con-
ducted.228 In cases that were fully litigated, the condemnee received 
an amount that reflected the low appraisal amount or more in 84.7% 
of the cases.229 The differences in outcomes between the settled cases 
and the fully litigated cases are evidence of a class divide in takings 
cases in which those property owners with less social and financial 
capital are much more likely to receive below market value compen-
sation in eminent domain proceedings than wealthier and more 
knowledgeable property owners who are often able to obtain compen-
sation in excess of market value. 
 The overwhelming percentage of property owners who received 
compensation below market value in eminent domain settlement cas-
es in Nassau County during the early 1960s is consistent with more 
                                                                                                                                       
gan. Further, the negotiator would try to accommodate the condemnee by making a visit to 
the condemnee’s home to demonstrate goodwill. Id. at 444-45. 
 In terms of lack of knowledge of value, Berger and Rohan note that there were signif-
icant information asymmetries between the County officials and the claimants. The clai-
mants were not shown the County appraisal and usually did not have their own appraisal. 
Further, the claimants often had very dated information about the value of their property 
that did not capture the true value of properties in an area that had experienced rapid ap-
preciation. The claimants also lacked the ability to value partial takings of their property. 
Id. at 445. Berger and Rohan also note that the eminent domain process placed some con-
demnees under emotional and financial stress. In terms of emotional stress, eminent do-
main is a forced sale process after all, and many claimants found the process to be mystify-
ing. Id. at 446. In terms of financial hardship, many claimants who were forced to relocate 
had trouble financing the purchase of a new property before they had been paid for the tak-
ing of their old property. Id.
 226. Berger & Rohan, supra note 219, at 433, 445. 
 227. Id. at 445. 
 228. Id. at 442-43. The tables reporting these figures round the data. 
 229. Id. at 450. 
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recent findings from California and Utah, which also indicate that 
the “practice of making lowball offers and of undercompensating con-
demnees is prevalent.”230 In California, the Institute for Legislative 
Practice at the McGeorge School of Law evaluated, inter alia, the dif-
ference between final settlement offers made by the government to 
condemnees in eminent domain litigation and the judgments con-
demnees obtained at trial in eminent domain litigation in California 
over a twelve-year period.231 This study was done in the late 1990s to 
assist the California Law Revision Commission while it considered 
proposed changes to the manner in which litigation expenses may be 
awarded in eminent domain cases. The Institute for Legislative Prac-
tice’s data set consisted of 237 eminent domain cases in California 
identified on Westlaw and Lexis between 1985 and 1999.232 Unlike 
the Berger and Rohan study, no comparison was made between emi-
nent domain cases settled in a nonlitigation context and those that 
were litigated. The Institute for Legislative Practice found the aver-
age jury verdict was 41% higher than the condemnor’s final offer, and 
the average bench verdict was 33% higher than the condemnor’s  
final offer.233
 In 1999, the Salt Lake Tribune conducted an investigative report 
of more than 200 properties acquired by the Utah Department of 
Transportation (UDOT) between 1994 and 1999.234 The reporters dis-
covered more than 80% of the property owners who contested 
UDOT’s appraisal in court received substantially higher compensa-
tion than UDOT had offered them.235 The mean increase over UDOT’s 
                                                                                                                                       
 230. Memorandum from Gideon Kanner, Consultant to the Cal. Law Revision Comm’n, 
to the Cal. Law Revision Comm’n, 9 (Nov. 10, 1999), available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/ 
pub/1999/M99-66s1.pdf. 
 231. Todd A. Schaffer & J. Clark Kelso, Inst. for Legislative Practice, Jury Verdicts in 
California Eminent Domain Cases: Some Descriptive Statistics, 1 (submitted to the Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission on Nov. 11, 1999), available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/ 
pub/1999/M99-66s1.pdf. 
 232. Id.
 233. Memorandum from Nathaniel Sterling, Executive Secretary, Cal. Law Revision 
Comm’n to the Cal. Law Revision Comm’n (Nov. 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/1999/M99-66s1.pdf. 
 234. Ray Rivera, UDOT: Fair Deals or Land Grabs?: Buy-Ups Often Leave Trail of Bit-
terness and Mistrust, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 24, 1999, at A1. 
 235. Of the more than 200 cases that the Salt Lake Tribune examined, there had been 
a settlement or a jury had returned a verdict in ninety-seven of the cases at the time the 
research for the article had been completed. Of these ninety-seven cases, property owners 
had favorable outcomes in eighty. Id. There is an issue of how representative these cases 
were given that a majority of property owners did not challenge UDOT’s final offer. Id.
Perhaps UDOT made fair offers to most property owners, and any claims to the contrary 
were “just a bunch of baloney,” as one satisfied condemnee stated. Id. On the other, maybe 
a large percentage of those who did not challenge UDOT’s final offer were particularly vul-
nerable to hard bargaining tactics on the part of UDOT or were otherwise more susceptible 
to receiving lowball offers than those property owners who challenged UDOT’s offer  
in court. 
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final offer for this group of owners was 41%.236 In the only four cases 
decided by jury trial, the net gain for the property owners over 
UDOT’s offer ranged from 43% to 115%, and from $190,000 to 
$1,600,000 in terms of absolute dollars.237
 The Tribune reporter found the disparity between the appraisals, 
which formed the basis of UDOT’s offer to condemnees, and the reco-
veries condemnees were able to obtain at trial could be explained by 
the quality of UDOT’s property appraisals.238 The article reported 
UDOT relied exclusively upon a very small number of outside ap-
praisers and suggested these appraisers may have felt some pressure 
to lowball the appraisals in order to stay in the good graces of 
UDOT.239 Unsurprisingly, the appraisers and UDOT denied UDOT 
had pressured any appraiser to submit a lowball appraisal.240 In fact, 
UDOT countered that attorneys for property owners utilized a select 
group of appraisers who were expected to generate inflated apprais-
als.241 Just as Berger and Rohan had postulated that many property 
owners in Nassau County probably settled for compensation below 
market value due to their emotional and financial stress, several of 
the property owners The Tribune interviewed reported the eminent 
domain process had exacted a high toll on them both emotionally and 
financially. This caused some of these property owners to settle for a 
smaller amount of compensation than they believed was justified.242
 Scholars outside of legal academia have conducted empirical re-
search analyzing the economic relationship between the compensa-
tion paid to property owners in eminent domain proceedings and the 
fair market value of the properties taken. Patricia Munch analyzed 
data on property acquisitions from three large urban renewal 
projects in Chicago from 1962 to 1970, a time in which the Chicago 
Department of Urban Renewal invoked its eminent domain power to ac-
quire property.243 Munch’s regression analysis revealed “high-valued  
parcels systematically receive more than market value and low-
valued parcels receive less than market value.”244
                                                                                                                                       
 236. Id.
 237. Id.
 238. Id.
 239. Id. Between 1996 and 1998, UDOT repeatedly contracted with just four appraisers 
who performed 86% of UDOT’s appraisals during this period, with one of these appraisers 
alone accounting for 46% of the contracts. Id. Others have also claimed that appraisers re-
tained by the government tend to submit conservative bids in an effort to secure future 
business. Kanner, supra note 225, at 1107. 
 240. Rivera, supra note 234.
 241. Id.
 242. Id.
 243. Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. OF POL. ECON.
473, 485 (1976). 
 244. Id. at 495.  
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 Terrence Clauretie, William Kuhn, and R. Keith Schwer sought to 
evaluate whether the appraisers utilized by local officials to value res-
idential property the government sought to take by eminent domain 
valued the properties differently from how such properties would have 
been valued in free market transactions.245 The authors studied sixty 
properties taken by Clark County, Nevada as part of the expansion of 
McCarran International airport in Las Vegas, Nevada, and 374 similar 
properties located nearby that were sold in arms-length, open market 
transactions.246 Clauretie, Kuhn, and Schwer found the appraisers uti-
lized by Clark County over-appraised the sixty properties taken by 
eminent domain in their sample by 17% in the aggregate.247 Consistent 
with Patricia Munch’s study, however, Clauretie, Kuhn, and Schwer 
also found the government appraisers valued high and low-value prop-
erties differently. Low-value properties were under-appraised and 
high-value properties were over-appraised.248
 More recently, Yun-chien Chang conducted an empirical study of 
the compensation paid to property owners in eminent domain settle-
ments in New York City from 1990 to 2002.249 Overall, Chang found 
New York City paid $17,311,176 to eighty-nine condemnees in emi-
nent domain settlements involving residential properties although 
the aggregate estimated fair market value for those properties was 
$21,173,198, which meant the settlements as a group represented a 
23% discount from market value. Chang further reported that con-
demnees did not receive equitable settlements as only 7% received a 
settlement roughly approximating the fair market value of their 
property.250 Of the other property owners who settled, 53% received 
                                                                                                                                       
 245. Terrence M. Clauretie, William Kuhn & R. Keith Schwer, Residential Properties 
Taken Under Eminent Domain: Do Government Appraisers Track Market Values?, 26 J.
REAL EST. RES. 317, 318 (2004). 
 246. Id.
 247. Id. at 326. 
 248. Id. One other study conducted by Krisandra Guidry and A. Quang Do compared 
properties acquired by the California Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”) under 
eminent domain with similar properties sold in comparable neighborhoods under free mar-
ket conditions. Krisandra Guidry & A. Quang Do, Eminent Domain and Just Compensation 
for Single-Family Homes, 66 APPRAISAL J. 231 (1998). Guidry and Do conclude that the 
condemnees in their study received a sales price that was on the average 4.71% higher than 
the sales prices that the sample of property owners in their study who sold their property 
on the free market received. Id. at 235. They suggest that this premium results from the 
fact that government bodies seek to avoid lengthy and costly litigation that could be gener-
ated by owners dissatisfied with the amount of compensation condemning agencies would 
offer them. Id. at 231. Unlike the Munch study or the Clauretie, Kuhn, and Schwer study, 
Guidry and Do do not evaluate whether there was any vertical inequity in the manner in 
which property owners in their sample who owned low-value properties and property own-
ers who owned high-value properties were compensated by Caltrans. This oversight rend-
ers suspect their sweeping conclusion that “[s]ingle-family homeowners are more than fair-
ly compensated under eminent domain acquisitions.” Id. at 235. 
 249. Yun-chien Chang, An Empirical Study of Compensation Paid in Eminent Domain 
Settlements: New York City 1990-2002, 39 J. LEGAL. STUD. 201 (2010).   
 250. Id. at 204. 
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compensation below fair market value, and 40% received more than 
fair market value.251 Interestingly, he notes that 40% of the residen-
tial condemnees who settled with New York City received compensa-
tion he describes as “extreme compensation payment,” which he de-
fines as compensation that is either higher than 150% or lower than 
50% of fair market value.252
B.   Foreclosure Sales and Resales of “Foreclosure-Status” Property 
 This Section will review several empirical studies of either foreclo-
sure sales or resales on the open market of property initially pur-
chased by the resale seller through the foreclosure process, a type of 
property some refer to as “foreclosure-status” property. Given that a 
foreclosure sale is a type of forced sale lacking many of the attributes 
of a sale under fair market value conditions as discussed previously, 
many courts and legal scholars believe “properties sold at foreclosure 
sales often [are sold] below fair market value.”253 In contrast, one 
might expect the winning bidder at a foreclosure sale, whether such a 
bidder is the mortgagee or a third party, to resell the property for its 
fair market value in an effort to maximize his or her investment in 
the property given such a seller is not legally compelled in most in-
stances to sell the previously foreclosed property in question. Never-
theless, just because a sale is not a forced sale in some technical 
sense does not mean the sale constitutes a sale conducted under con-
ditions likely to yield fair market value. 
1.   Empirical Studies of Foreclosure Sales 
 A number of law professors have examined the fairness of foreclo-
sure sales in terms of whether the current laws governing real prop-
erty foreclosure sales adequately protect any equity a mortgagor may 
have built up in his or her property. Very few law professors, how-
ever, have published law review articles compiling and analyzing  
data on the foreclosure process.254 Yet, it appears that more law re-
views have published empirical studies of the foreclosure process 
than empirical studies of eminent domain or any other legal process 
involving the forced sale of real property. This Section will review 
two empirical studies of foreclosure sales published by law profes-
sors, focusing upon the conclusions each author draws about the fair-
                                                                                                                                       
 251. Id.
 252. Id. Chang does warn those who read his study that his findings on settled compen-
sations in eminent domain cases may not be generalizable to nonsettled condemnation cases 
and that the sales prices in the New York City real estate market may not represent the fair 
market value of the properties assuming a valuation based upon “the highest and best use” of 
the property in all circumstances, as his statistical study assumes. Id. at 231-33. 
 253. See, e.g., Kooloian v. Suburban Land Co., 873 A.2d 95, 100 (R.I. 2005). 
 254. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 60, at 1426. 
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ness of the prices paid for properties sold at foreclosure sales.255 In 
order to assess the fairness of the foreclosure sale process, both au-
thors gathered data on the foreclosure sale itself and on subsequent 
resales of properties purchased at foreclosed sales. 
 Steven Wechsler evaluated all mortgage foreclosure actions be-
ginning in Onondaga County, New York during 1979 and culminat-
ing in a foreclosure sale in either 1979 or 1980.256 The data set con-
sisted of 118 such transactions.257 The mortgagee was the successful 
bidder in 77% of the cases, and a third party was the successful bid-
der in 23% of the cases.258 According to Wechsler, in the cases where 
the resale price could be calculated, mortgagees made profits in thir-
ty-five of the cases, with a median profit of $5080 on these resales.259
However, mortgagees suffered losses in thirty-seven cases with a 
median loss of $6900 on these resales.260 To put this data in perspec-
tive, the median original loan amount for all of the properties in 
Wechsler’s study amounted to $20,400,261 and the median amount 
that mortgagees had invested in the property as of the foreclosure 
date amounted to approximately $23,000.262 Though his data showed 
the median loss was $1820 more than the median profit on resale, 
Wechsler concluded that when profits and losses were netted from all 
of the resales, the average mortgagee sustained a loss of more than 
$13,000 on each resale.263 In contrast, the third-party purchasers 
made a profit upon resale in fourteen of the fifteen cases, with profits 
ranging from $7000 to $54,000.264
                                                                                                                                       
 255. The studies reviewed are: Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical 
Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of Foreclosures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 639 (1997); Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale 
as De Facto Strict Foreclosure—An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subse-
quent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 850 (1985). 
 256. Wechsler, supra note 255, at 865. 
 257. Id. at 865-66. 
 258. Id. at 875. Properties that a lender acquires at a foreclosure sale are referred to as 
“real estate owned” (REO) within the lending business. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 60, 
at 1423. 
 259. Wechsler, supra note 255, at 880. Wechsler did not take account of the mortga-
gee’s foreclosure costs, carrying costs, or marketing costs upon resale. Nelson & Whitman, 
supra note 60, at 1427. If Wechsler had taken these transaction costs into account, it is 
likely that he would have reported that mortgagees made a profit in a number of the re-
sales but not in roughly half of the resales. Id.
 260. Wechsler, supra note 255, at 880, 882. 
 261. Id. at 872. 
 262. Id. at 874. Wechsler defines a lender’s total investment in the property as being 
comprised of “[t]he sum of the debt balance, accrued interest, and additional amounts due 
the mortgagee, added to any surplus amount paid to the mortgagor or junior lienors.” Id.
 263. Id. at 882-83. A similar pattern emerged in Wechsler’s data analysis of foreclosed 
properties that a government agency acquired from mortgagees under an insurance con-
tract and then later resold. Id. at 883-84. 
 264. Id. at 883 n.182. 
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 Debra Pogrund Stark conducted an ambitious empirical study of 
mortgage foreclosures in Cook County, Illinois in which she collected 
data on all real estate foreclosures commenced between July 1993 
and July 1994.265 Her study resulted in a number of interesting find-
ings. Like the Wechsler study, the Stark study found third parties 
were the successful bidders in a very small percentage of foreclosure 
cases. They acquired the property as a result of being the high bidder 
in 11.2% of the 1993 judicial sales and in 9.6% of the 1994 judicial 
sales.266 In contrast, “the mortgagee was the successful bidder in 
more than 80% of the cases” in her study.267
 Stark claims that one way to assess how fairly mortgagors are 
treated at foreclosure sales is to evaluate “the extent to which lenders 
and third-party bidders bid less than the fair market value of the 
property and then resell the property within one year after the foreclo-
sure sale.”268 Though Stark indicates a borrower may have been 
treated unfairly if property is sold below market value at a foreclosure 
sale and then resold within one year at a profit, her study lacks actual 
data on the fair market value of the properties sold at the foreclosure 
sale or the fair market value of the subset of these properties that were 
later resold within a year.269 Instead, Stark implies that if a resale 
takes place within one year of the foreclosure sale and the winning 
bidder at the foreclosure sale makes a profit on the resale, the pur-
chase price at the foreclosure sale may be deemed to have been below 
market value because the resale price presumably represented the fair 
market value for the property.270 Conversely, she assumes if the win-
ning bidder at the foreclosure sale did not make a profit upon a resale 
that took place within one year of the foreclosure sale that the foreclo-
sure sale constituted a sale at fair market value.271
 Overall, Stark’s conclusions about the extent to which the winning 
bidder at a foreclosure sale makes a profit upon reselling the proper-
ty within one year are quite consistent with Wechsler’s conclusions. 
Mortgagees who resold within one year of acquiring property at a fo-
reclosure sale resold the property for a nominal profit in 28.3% of the 
cases and incurred a loss 71.8% of the time.272 When Stark takes into 
account in the fact that carrying and resale costs can equal 10% of 
                                                                                                                                       
 265. Stark, supra note 255, at 656-57. 
 266. Id. at 663. 
 267. Id. at 673. 
 268. Id. at 665. 
 269. Although the resales are not forced sales themselves in any technical sense, one 
cannot assume that all of the properties that were resold by lenders or third parties were 
resold under fair market value conditions. In many of these instances, one could postulate 
that the lenders, at the least, were not typically motivated and that they were not attempt-
ing primarily to maximize the sales price. See infra Part V.B.2.  
 270. Stark, supra note 255, at 666-67. 
271. Id.
 272. Id. at 666. 
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the resale price based upon what many bank officials she interviewed 
told her,273 she indicates lenders only made a true profit in 20% of 
their resales.274 Third parties who resold properties within a year af-
ter they acquired them at foreclosure sales made true profits at a 
much higher rate than the mortgagees who resold.275 Further, the 
successful third-party bidders in the 1993 cases made much more 
substantial profits upon resale than the profits successful mortgagee 
bidders were able to make upon resale.276
 Based upon the studies conducted by Wechsler and Stark, one can 
only draw limited inferences about whether foreclosure sales yield 
fair market value prices. It appears clear that most of the third par-
ties in the two studies who purchased properties at foreclosure sales 
and then resold these properties within a few years had purchased 
many of the properties for prices below market value given the rather 
substantial profits that many of these third parties were able to 
make upon resale. Nevertheless, in both studies, the mortgagees 
were the most successful bidders at the foreclosure sales in a sub-
stantial majority of the cases and were also the most frequent sellers 
of previously foreclosed property. In considering the findings from 
Wechsler’s and Stark’s studies together, a large percentage of mort-
gagees failed to make a nominal profit upon resale. When one factors 
in carrying and resale costs, an even larger percentage of mortgagees 
failed to make a true profit upon resale. 
                                                                                                                                       
 273. Id. at 661. Elsewhere, she calculates that total carrying and resale costs for a “typ-
ical” sale can constitute up to 14% of the selling price. Id. at 676. Nelson and Whitman also 
report that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has published data that reveals that 
the carrying and resale costs for residential properties that the VA has foreclosed upon 
throughout the country has ranged between 10%and 14%in recent years. Nelson & Whit-
man, supra note 60, at 1425. 
 274. Stark, supra note 255, at 667. As indicated, Wechsler likely would have concluded 
that fewer mortgagees made a profit upon resale than he reported if he had taken into ac-
count the type of transaction costs that Stark accounted for in her study. 
 275. Id. at 666-67. The fact that successful third-party bidders at foreclosures sales 
made profits in the overwhelming number of resale cases suggests that third parties bid-
ders targeted properties in which the value of the property substantially exceeds the mort-
gage debt. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 60, at 1428. In addition, most lenders do not act 
as real estate speculators who flip properties for short-term gain; instead they are primari-
ly interested in recovering as much of their investment in the foreclosed property as possi-
ble and are normally content to allow third parties to purchase those properties offered at 
foreclosure sales that have the potential of returning substantial profits from a short-term 
resale if the third parties bid more than the lender’s full credit bid. Id. at 1423-24, 1428. 
 276. Stark, supra note 255, at 667. The profits that nine successful third-party bidders 
in the 1993 foreclosure sale cases made upon resale ranged from 32% to 326%. In contrast, 
eight of the lenders who were the winning bidders at the 1993 foreclosure sales made a 
true profit upon resale within a year. Id. In these eight cases, if one assumes carrying and 
resale costs of 10%, lenders barely made a true profit in five of the cases as they resold the 
properties in these cases for slightly more than 10% of the foreclosure sales price. Id. at 
667 n.120. Of the remaining three cases, the lenders involved made a profit of 37% in one 
case, approximately 50% in another case, and of more than 100% in the remaining case. Id.
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 Though this comparison of foreclosure sales prices and resale pric-
es may help one form an impression about the fairness of the foreclo-
sure sale and the extent to which mortgagees or third-party purchas-
ers at foreclosure sales act as speculators or vulture buyers, it alone 
does not prove whether the foreclosure sale or the resale yields a fair 
market value price. Therefore, as the studies in the next Section 
make clear, the assumption that the failure to make a profit upon re-
sale proves the foreclosure sale yielded a fair market value price is 
not sound.277 Theoretically, it is equally plausible that in many in-
stances neither the foreclosure sale nor the subsequent resale of the 
previously foreclosed property were conducted under fair market val-
ue conditions. To this end, the fact that Wechsler and Stark each find 
nearly all third-party purchasers made a profit on resale and a large 
percentage of mortgagees failed to make a profit on sales of foreclosed 
property may suggest third-party purchasers were much more selec-
tive than mortgagees in the type of properties they purchased at fo-
reclosure sales and were much more typically motivated sellers with 
respect to resales of previously foreclosed properties than the mort-
gagees who resold foreclosed properties. 
2.   Empirical Studies of Resales of “Foreclosure-Status” Property 
 As indicated previously, the mortgagee usually ends up being the 
entity that acquires real estate through the foreclosure process.278
Theoretically, lenders who acquire foreclosed property, whether a 
bank or some other financial institution, should be in a position to 
sell these real estate owned (REO) properties under fair market val-
ue conditions. Under ideal conditions, the department at a bank or 
other financial institution with responsibility for reselling REO prop-
erty acquired through the foreclosure process should act as an “effi-
cient salvor” and seek to maximize the sales price obtained for any 
given piece of real estate.279
 Nevertheless, the approach an efficient salvor would take to mar-
keting real estate is inconsistent with the approach an institution 
would take if it had goals other than selling certain real estate hold-
                                                                                                                                       
 277. To be fair to Stark, who was primarily interested in evaluating the fairness and ef-
ficiency of the foreclosure process, fairness is often judged by how lenders and mortgagors 
emerge from the foreclosure process from a comparative economic perspective. Based upon 
this criterion, foreclosure sales may be relatively fair in a large percentage of cases even 
though many foreclosure sales may not yield a fair market value price. 
 278. Stark, supra note 255, at 663; Wechsler, supra note 255, at 875. 
 279. Edward J. Kane, Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage, 45 J. FIN. 755, 757 
(1990). Kane indicates than an efficient salvor preserves an asset’s value, appraises the as-
set’s value, and seeks to broaden the pool of potential buyers for the asset by identifying 
and communicating with parties that otherwise would not have considered purchasing the 
salvaged asset. Id.
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ings to maximize the present value of the real estate. To this end, 
William Hardin and Marvin Wolverton stated as follows: 
Because institutional owners of foreclosed properties appear to be 
subject to atypical motivations that cause them to value some de-
gree of reduction in time on market, and marketing time can be 
compressed by acceptance of a below-market price, it is reasonable 
to expect market prices for foreclosed properties to be systemati-
cally less than market prices for non-foreclosed properties.280
In fact, a small number of empirical studies conducted mostly by 
business school scholars in the fields of finance and real estate con-
firm banks and other lenders have employed more aggressive mar-
keting strategies than an efficient salvor would use in order to speed 
up the liquidation of certain real estate assets.281
 James Shilling, John Benjamin, and C. F. Sirmans sought to es-
timate the net realizable value for distressed real estate lenders ac-
quired through the foreclosure process.282 In contrast to the fair mar-
ket value of a particular property, the net realizable value is the val-
ue of a “property to a particular investor or enterprise, a value that is 
based on the amount realized from its sale, adjusted for selling ex-
penses.”283 Although the expected gross selling price of real estate can 
be expected to increase the longer the property is exposed to the 
market,284 most lenders that acquire distressed real estate through 
the foreclosure process prefer to sell these properties sometime short-
ly after they acquire them.285 Assuming the fair market value of a 
property is more than the net realizable value, the difference be-
tween the fair market value and the net realizable value can be re-
ferred to as the liquidating discount.286
                                                                                                                                       
 280. William G. Hardin, III & Marvin L. Wolverton, The Relationship Between Foreclo-
sure Status and Apartment Price, 12 J. REAL EST. RES. 101, 101 (1996) (citation omitted). 
Certain commentators have identified some of the reasons banks and other financial insti-
tutions have opted to pursue aggressive liquidating strategies with respect to their real es-
tate assets that are inconsistent with the goal of maximizing the sales price for these as-
sets. These include the need to meet stringent equity capital requirements mandated by 
certain governmental regulations and the fact that the stock market places a comparative-
ly lower value on banks that hold a relatively high proportion of their assets in real estate. 
Id. at 102. 
 281. Id.
 282. James D. Shilling, John D. Benjamin & C. F. Sirmans, Estimating Net Realizable 
Value for Distressed Real Estate, 5 J. REAL EST. RES. 129, 130, 136 (1990). 
 283. Id. at 130; see also AMERICAN INST. OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, DICTIONARY OF 
REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL 208 (2d ed. 1989) (defining net realizable value as “[m]arket value 
minus the cost of disposition”).  
 284. Shilling et al., supra note 282, at 133; see also John D. Benjamin , G. Donald Jud & 
G. Stacy Sirmans, What Do We Know About Real Estate Brokerage?, 20 J. REAL EST. RES. 5, 
14, 16 (2000) (observing “time on the market (TOM) is positively related to selling price”). 
 285. Shilling et al., supra note 282, at 138. 
 286. Id. at 129. 
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 To estimate the net realizable value of distressed properties, the 
authors used a sample of sixty-two residential condominiums sold in 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana in 1985.287 The sample included both condo-
miniums sold under fair market value conditions and comparable 
condominiums liquidated by a local financial institution.288 To meas-
ure the extent of the liquidating discount, if any, the authors utilize a 
multiple regression analysis. Their regression analysis determined 
there was a 24% liquidating discount for the distressed properties in 
the sample as compared to the properties sold under fair market  
value conditions.289
 Fred Forgey, Ronald Rutherford, and Michael VanBuskirk fol-
lowed up on the Shilling, Benjamin, and Sirmans study by evaluating 
sales of previously foreclosed single-family homes sold by individuals 
or financial institutions.290 These authors collected data on residen-
tial properties sold and closed upon in Arlington, Texas between July 
1991 and January 1993.291 Of the 2482 sales in the data set, 11.28% 
had a foreclosure status, meaning the homes had previously been ac-
quired by the seller at a foreclosure sale.292
 The findings of the Forgey et al. study are strikingly similar to the 
results of the Shilling et al. study as the nearly 300 foreclosure-
status, single-family homes in the former sold for an average of 
$15,038.40 less in absolute dollars than the other houses in the data 
set.293 In percentage terms, this meant the previously foreclosed 
homes sold at a 23% liquidating discount as compared to the other 
single-family homes in the sample.294
 William Hardin and Marvin Wolverton extended the findings of 
Shilling et al. and Forgey et al. by evaluating resales of income-
producing real estate initially acquired at a foreclosure sale.295 Har-
din and Wolverton collected data on ninety sales of income-producing 
apartment buildings in Phoenix, Arizona to noninstitutional buyers 
in which the real estate closing took place between January 1993 and 
November 1994.296 Ten percent of the sales in their sample consisted 
of foreclosure-status properties.297
                                                                                                                                       
 287. Id. at 135. 
 288. Id.
 289. Id. at 136. 
 290. Fred A. Forgey, Ronald C. Rutherford & Michael L. VanBuskirk, Effect of Foreclo-
sure Status on Residential Selling Price, 9 J. REAL EST. RES. 313, 314 (1994). 
 291. Id.
 292. Id. at 315. 
 293. Id. at 316. 
 294. Id. at 318. 
 295. Hardin & Wolverton, supra note 280, at 102. 
 296. Id. at 105. 
 297. Id.
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 Though Hardin and Wolverton evaluated sales of income-
producing as opposed to residential property and collected data in a 
different geographical location than the locations utilized in earlier 
studies, their findings are nearly identical to the findings of both 
Shilling et al. and Forgey et al. Results of the Hardin and Wolverton 
study indicate the foreclosure-status apartment buildings in their 
sample sold for 22.2% less than the nonforeclosure-status apartment 
properties.298 Taken together, the empirical studies on resales of fo-
reclosure-status property indicate these sales are not conducted un-
der fair market value conditions. It is likely that the sellers in this 
context are often not typically motivated for one reason or another 
and are willing to sell the property for a liquidating discount. 
 Overall, the empirical studies reviewed in this Section make it 
clear that one cannot simply assume real property is sold for fair 
market value without evaluating whether the conditions necessary 
for a sale to occur under fair market value conditions are present. 
Property that is offered for sale to the public under a forced sale by 
definition is not offered for sale under fair market value conditions. 
Unbeknownst to most lay people and law professors alike, the empir-
ical studies on eminent domain compensation reveal that one cannot 
even assume that most condemnees in eminent domain cases are 
paid fair market value for their property even though the U.S. Con-
stitution requires fair market value be paid to condemnees in almost 
all cases. Further, the empirical studies on resales of foreclosure-
status property make clear that it is important to evaluate whether 
all market value conditions exist in any given sale, including whether 
the seller and the buyer are typically motivated, even with respect to 
a nonforced sale in which one might reasonably assume that fair 
market value conditions would prevail. Finally, the empirical studies 
on eminent domain reveal that when property owners with different 
socioeconomic backgrounds have their property forcibly sold, such 
sales can produce regressive vertical inequities. As a result, weal-
thier people often benefit economically from such forced sales and the 
less wealthy often lose significant wealth when such sales are fina-
lized and, sometimes, their ability to maintain their status as proper-
ty owners at all after such sales. 
                                                                                                                                       
 298. Id. at 108. In comparing their findings with the findings of Shilling et al. and For-
gery et al., Hardin and Wolverton adjusted the reported discounts in the earlier studies us-
ing a methodology called the Halvorsen and Palmquist methodology that was used in their 
study to ensure consistency. However, the adjusted discounts were slight. As applied to the 
Forgery et al. study, the adjusted discount rate is reported as 20.4%; the adjusted discount 
rate for the Shilling et al. study is reported as 21.3%. Id. at n.2. 
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VI.   DOES RACE MATTER IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS AND REAL
ESTATE FINANCE
 Do people with certain characteristics face obstacles in their ef-
forts to accumulate and maintain assets that other people do not? Is 
the market colorblind? Are the rich and poor treated evenhandedly in 
the markets for real estate and other capital? We focus particularly 
on whether someone’s race may present a barrier to acquiring or 
maintaining land and other real estate assets or to realizing the po-
tential economic value of land and other real estate holdings. 
 To this end, we address two overarching issues relevant to assess-
ing whether the racial wealth gap exists in part due to discrimination 
in the real estate and real estate lending markets. First, we focus 
specifically on previous research on aspects of possible price discrim-
ination in real estate sales as well as discrimination by real estate 
brokers and salespersons in the manner in which they market prop-
erties to people of different races and ethnicities.299 Second, we con-
sider the extent to which discrimination may exist in real estate 
finance by reviewing research in this area and considering cases filed 
by African-American farmers against the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture (USDA) that are based upon claims the USDA violated the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act300 in such a way that it has driven 
many African-American farmers into foreclosure over the course of 
the past few decades. 
A.   Studies of Racial Discrimination in Real Estate Pricing and Mar-
keting 
 For purposes of our discussion, the most relevant literature on 
price discrimination addresses whether different kinds of consumers 
                                                                                                                                       
 299. The ensuing discussion focuses upon literature that has examined whether Afri-
can Americans pay more for housing than whites despite the fact that the focus of our Ar-
ticle is on the prices that a property owner receives upon the forced sale of their property. 
However, unlike the studies that show that wealthier property owners fare better than 
low- to middle-class property owners in eminent domain proceedings, we are not aware of 
any studies that evaluate whether there are differences in the prices that African Ameri-
cans and whites are paid when their property is sold under different types of forced sales. 
Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether such racial differences in forced sale prices 
exist because, among other reasons, there are studies that indicate that racial valuation 
differences do exist in such areas as tort law. For example, some scholars have found evi-
dence that minority plaintiffs have had their tort injuries valued by civil juries at a lower 
level than white plaintiffs who have suffered similar injuries. See generally AUDREY CHIN 
& MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY
TRIALS (1985); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900-1949, 49 
HOW. L.J. 99 (2005). 
 300. Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)-(f) (2008) (prohibiting 
discrimination in lending on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital 
status, or age). 
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pay different prices for the same commodities.301 In this vein, David 
Caplovitz published an early and influential study that found the 
poor may indeed pay higher prices for many goods and services.302
His study has stimulated much additional research. Price discrimina-
tion has been intensively studied for a number of commodities, in-
cluding groceries and other foods, automobiles, and even Broadway 
tickets.303 We focus our review on selected literature on racial price 
discrimination in real estate markets. 
 Before reviewing literature on racial price discrimination for real 
estate, we offer a few observations about the nature of the price of 
complex commodities such as land and real estate. To a first ap-
proximation, there are many goods and services that we can reasona-
bly treat as being standardized. Commodities such as wheat, oil, or 
milk are fairly homogeneous, or nearly so, because there are well-
known systems for grading such commodities. But for many complex 
goods such as automobiles, high-tech computers, and land and real 
estate, analysis is complicated because the goods themselves are 
more complicated and standardization is much more difficult. In par-
ticular, no two real estate parcels, whether these parcels are farm-
land, commercial buildings, or residential structures, are truly iden-
tical in all respects. In conducting economic analyses on issues in-
volving complex goods such as real estate, it is important to attempt 
to control as clearly as possible for differences in the characteristics 
of such goods. 
 Economists and other social scientists have used regression analy-
sis in order to control for many such characteristics simultane-
ously.304 These regressions produce hedonic price indexes, which focus  
                                                                                                                                       
 301. For an excellent review of the theoretical literature on price discrimination, in-
cluding a review of literature addressing topics such as price discrimination over different 
periods of time and geographical location, see generally LOUIS PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF 
PRICE DISCRIMINATION (1983). 
 302. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF LOW-INCOME 
FAMILIES (1967).  It should be noted that price discrimination by income, if effective, may 
disadvantage higher-income as well as lower-income consumers, depending on the context. 
For example, much airline price discrimination is presumably aimed at extracting higher 
fares from business and other consumers with a greater purchasing power. 
 303. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bar-
gaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995); Chanjin Chung & Samuel L. Myers, 
Jr., Do the Poor Pay More for Food? An Analysis of Grocery Store Availability and Food 
Price Disparities, 33 J. CONSUMER AFF. 276 (1999); Charles S. Goodman, Do the Poor Pay 
More?, 32 J. MARKETING 18 (1968); Kathryn Graddy, Do Fast-Food Chains Price Discrimi-
nate on the Race and Income Characteristics of an Area?, 15 J. BUS. & ECON. STATS. 391 
(1997); Lashawn Richburg Hayes, Are Prices Higher for the Poor in New York City?, 23 J.
CONSUMER POL’Y 127 (2000); Howard Kunreuther, Why the Poor May Pay More for Food: 
Theoretical and Empirical Evidence, 46 J. BUS. 368 (1973); Phillip Leslie, Price Discrimina-
tion in Broadway Theater, 35 RAND J. ECON. 520 (2004). 
 304. Regression analysis is a statistical technique applied to a set of data for finding 
the best fitting relationship between a dependent variable (e.g., property selling price) and 
a set of independent or explanatory variables (e.g., size of the unit, measures of its quality, 
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on housing characteristics that give utility or satisfaction, hence “he-
donic.”305 Typically, a regression of sales price against land and struc-
tural characteristics, for example, is used to standardize transac-
tions. Now, if X paid $3000 per acre for land that the hedonic regres-
sion estimates was worth $3500, but Y paid $2000 for land that the 
hedonic predicts a selling price of $1500, we would surmise that Y
paid a higher price per unit of real estate services. Studies of racial 
price discrimination carry out such calculations for a sample of many 
consumers, and then examine whether, for example, African Ameri-
cans or other minorities are systematically treated like consumer X
(i.e., they regularly pay less or receive a discount to estimated market 
price) or consumer Y (i.e., they regularly pay more than the model 
predicts which is often referred to as paying a premium). 
 In real estate, other complications can arise that social scientists 
attempt to take into account in conducting their regression analysis. 
For example, many purchases involve simultaneous financing deci-
sions. Therefore, in these cases, not only do characteristics of complex 
goods like real estate or automobiles come into play, but adjustments 
for risks and transactions costs do as well.306 How does a borrower’s 
credit rating impact the type of loan they can get to purchase a spe-
cific parcel of property? Will future prices for this kind of real estate 
or this neighborhood rise or fall relative to prices for other commodi-
ties? How easily can a lender foreclose on a defaulted transaction if 
necessary? How readily might we expect this real estate collateral to 
be sold and for how much if it is foreclosed upon, in good markets and 
in bad?  
                                                                                                                                       
and neighborhood characteristics). The hedonic regressions we consider often have one or 
more variables representing a buyer’s race or ethnicity. Some variables have natural 
measures (e.g., dollars or square feet), but other variables that represent categories (e.g., 
single-family houses, compared to other structure types; or black buyers, compared to other 
races) are measured with so-called dummy variables, which take on the value one if a con-
dition is true or present, and zero otherwise. Standard regression models (“ordinary least 
squares”) also assume the dependent variable is the only “endogenous” variable, i.e. deter-
mined by the process under study, and that the independent variables are “exogenous,” or 
determined independently of the process we study. 
 305. Early on in the development of hedonic pricing analysis, Andrew Court and Zvi 
Griliches applied the method to study automobile and housing markets respectively. See
A.T. Court, Hedonic Price Indexes with Automotive Examples, in THE DYNAMICS OF 
AUTOMOBILE DEMAND 99 (1939); Irma Adelman & Zvi Griliches, On an Index of Quality 
Change, 56 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 535 (1961). These early studies along with some others were 
precursors of a large literature that followed theoretical underpinnings provided by Kelvin 
Lancaster and Sherwin Rosen. See Kelvin J. Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer 
Theory, 74 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1966); Sherwin Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: 
Product Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. POL. ECON. 34 (1974). 
 306. According to a famous model that underlies much of finance, the Modigliani-Miller 
Theorem, financing per se should not affect the price investors pay for an asset. Optimal 
decisions require first choosing the best (risk-adjusted) return, then the best way of financ-
ing that investment. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Cor-
poration Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). However, 
the assumptions are quite stringent for the Modigliani-Miller Theorem to hold strictly. 
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 Do regression studies demonstrate African Americans and other 
minorities pay more for housing? Economists and other social scien-
tists have not completely settled whether such differential pricing ex-
ists. As economists, two of the authors of this Article believe there is 
more evidence on one side of the debate than on the other. Early lite-
rature, such as John Kain and John Quigley’s classic study, tended to 
find blacks paid more for housing than whites once controls were put 
in place for characteristics of the housing unit.307 Later research, such 
as a study by James Follain and Stephen Malpezzi, tended to find 
discounts for African Americans.308 In an effort to reconcile the earli-
er and later studies, some scholars suggested some of the differences 
between the earlier and later studies may have been attributable to 
changing market conditions and the effects of fair housing and other 
public policies since, unsurprisingly, the earlier studies tended to rely 
on older data.309 However, it seems unlikely these explanations could 
account for all the differences between the earlier and later studies. 
Instead, much of the difference is more likely ascribed to differences 
in data sources and methods. 
 One particularly important issue in determining whether minori-
ties pay more for housing is the difference of the effect of an individ-
ual’s race from the effect of neighborhood racial composition in the 
hedonic specification. Data that permit this are difficult to obtain, in 
no small part because of the confidentiality requirements of census 
and other household survey data that limit public information about 
the location of individual survey households. One of the first studies 
to obtain such data and carefully analyze it was Daniel Chambers’ 
Chicago study from the early 1990s.310 He found discounts tended to 
exist in Chicago’s black neighborhoods relative to prices in white 
neighborhoods once a wide variety of structural and other neighbor-
hood characteristics were taken into account.311 The discounts tended 
to fall as neighborhoods became more integrated.312 More to the point, 
                                                                                                                                       
 307. See, e.g., JOHN F. KAIN & JOHN M. QUIGLEY, HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION: A MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 294 (1975). 
 308. See, e.g., James R. Follain Jr. & Stephen Malpezzi, Another Look at Racial Differ-
ences in Housing Prices, 18 URB. STUD. 195 (1981). 
 309. See, e.g., Ann B. Schnare & Raymond J. Struyk, Segmentation in Urban Housing 
Markets, 3 J. URB. ECON. 146, 147-48 (1976). If a given housing market is racially segre-
gated, prices for housing in black and white neighborhoods could rise or fall at different 
rates over time. Amongst other reasons, such a different pattern in price changes could 
arise as a result of economic gentrification (irrespective of the race of the gentrifiers) or dif-
ferent rates of growth in white and black populations or incomes. See generally John Ying-
er, Prejudice and Discrimination in the Urban Housing Market, in CURRENT ISSUES IN 
URBAN ECONOMICS 430 (Peter Mieszkowski & Mahlon Straszheim eds., 1979) (providing a 
more complete discussion of these issues). 
 310. Daniel N. Chambers, The Racial Housing Price Differential and Racially Transi-
tional Neighborhoods, 32 J. URB. ECON. 214 (1992). 
 311. Id. at 219. 
 312. Id. at 225. 
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when he examined prices paid by black households in largely white 
neighborhoods, he found no statistically significant difference be-
tween the prices blacks paid for houses and the prices whites paid.313
Later research by Katherine Kiel and Jeffrey Zabel with generally 
similar data from Denver and Philadelphia, as well as Chicago, 
tended to confirm Chamber’s broad conclusions.314
 While many studies of price discrimination in housing rely on the 
hedonic regression method, there have been several important stu-
dies mostly addressing other aspects of housing discrimination based 
on the alternate approach of paired testing. This approach involves 
more direct tests of discrimination in the market, although these 
tests tend to yield less direct empirical evidence on possible sizes in 
price differentials consumers may experience. The method revolves 
around data collected from interviews with paired testers who are 
trained individuals sent to search for housing units or to obtain a 
mortgage who dress and otherwise act as similarly as possible as 
they utilize similar scripts addressing their desire to rent or purchase 
a home. 
 There have been three related major studies of housing markets 
with paired testers, about a decade apart, all supported by the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The earliest 
of these studies, published in 1979, focused primarily on blacks and 
whites and tended to find that real estate brokers treated whites and 
blacks substantially differently.315 The study found, among other 
things, real estate brokers tended to show whites looking for housing 
more units and units in better neighborhoods than blacks. One of the 
biggest differences tended to be in the number of initial units offered 
for review by the broker or salesperson before any actual units  
were shown.316
 The follow-up study, published in the early 1990s, revisited the is-
sue and also expanded the types of households studied; in particular, 
Hispanics as well as blacks and whites were analyzed.317 Broadly, the 
second round of paired testing found somewhat reduced, but still 
quite substantial, discriminatory practices by real estate brokers and 
salespersons in many markets. The latest study, published by HUD 
in 2002, further expanded the markets studied and also examined 
American Indians and Asians, as well as blacks and Hispanics rela-
                                                                                                                                       
 313. Id. at 224. 
 314. Katherine A. Kiel & Jeffrey E. Zabel, House Price Differentials in U.S. Cities: 
Household and Neighborhood Racial Effects, 5 J. HOUSING ECON. 143 (1996). 
 315. See RONALD E. WIENK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., MEASURING 
DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING MARKETS: THE HOUSING MARKET PRACTICES 
SURVEY 96 (1979).  
 316. Id. at 106.   
 317. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING 
DISCRIMINATION STUDY: SYNTHESIS 42 (1991). 
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tive to whites.318 There was yet again evidence of some progress, but 
substantial discriminatory biases remained. 
 To summarize the literature on racial discrimination in real estate 
markets—(1) most studies to date have focused on urban housing and 
few have examined racial issues in commercial or rural real estate; 
(2) while not unanimous, the most recent studies to explore the issue 
of price discrimination found housing units owned by blacks mostly 
in black or integrated neighborhoods trade at a discount relative to 
similar housing in white neighborhoods; and (3) while there is evi-
dence of some progress, in urban housing transactions, blacks are 
still often treated differentially, e.g., they are shown smaller numbers 
of units than similarly qualified whites and are often steered to black 
neighborhoods and away from white ones. 
B.   Is There Evidence of Racial Discrimination in Real Estate 
Finance? 
 Recently, civil rights organizations have pointed out African-
American borrowers are much more likely to have high-interest, sub-
prime loans than white borrowers. These allegations have now 
gained national attention. On March 13, 2009, the NAACP sued a 
number of subsidiaries of two major banks claiming these institu-
tions unlawfully steered African-American borrowers into high-
interest, subprime loans although many of these borrowers were eli-
gible, based upon their income, assets, and credit scores, for the less 
costly loans whites were much more likely to receive.319
 The issue of racial discrimination in mortgage markets first ex-
ploded in the public consciousness in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
when the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and the Wall Street Journal
published articles reporting the results of simple tabulations of dif-
ferences in mortgage approvals from Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) data.320 In one widely cited HMDA tabulation, in 1990 
blacks were rejected for mortgages 34% of the time; Hispanics, 22% of 
the time; and whites 14% of the time.321
 Both early and all subsequent HMDA data have shown blacks are 
rejected much more often than whites for mortgages. By itself this 
                                                                                                                                       
 318. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I
HDS 2000, iii (2002).  
 319. E. Scott Reckard, Housing; NAACP Suits Claim Mortgage Bias, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
14, 2009, at B1. 
 320. Bill Dedman, The Color of Money, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 1-4, 1988, available at
http://powerreporting.com/color/color_of_money.pdf; Paulette Thomas & Raquel Santiago, 
Mortgage Rejection Rate for Minorities is Quadruple That of Whites, Study Finds, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 21, 1991, at A2. 
 321. Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Expanded 
Data on Residential Lending, 77 FED. RES. BULL. 859, 868-81 (1991). 
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tells us little about discrimination. The most obvious issue, and the 
one first addressed by researchers, is that there are many reasons to 
expect a correlation between race/ethnicity and other characteristics 
reasonably affecting mortgage approvals, such as credit score, bor-
rower ability to pay, other mortgage terms, and possibly other va-
riables like expected property appreciation in a given neighborhood. 
 It turns out to be extremely difficult to control for all the possible 
relevant variables in such a regression. The first serious attempt was 
by Alicia Munnell and others at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.322
They required Boston area banks to supplement their HMDA submis-
sions with additional data on characteristics of the borrowers, includ-
ing information on an applicant’s total debt and net worth, rudimenta-
ry information the banks had on their applicants’ credit scores, and 
some additional information about the characteristics of the financial 
transaction.323 In their widely-cited paper (the Boston Fed study), they 
found when they added the set of collected variables, measures of dis-
parate treatment fell, but were by no means eliminated.324 Black and 
Hispanic applicants were still 60% more likely to be denied mortgage 
loans than white applicants with similar characteristics.325 Given the 
fact that the simple unadjusted measure suggested minorities were 2.7 
times as likely as whites to be denied mortgage loans, it is clear these 
additional variables mattered, but 60% remained a seemingly substan-
tial measure of disparate treatment. 
 Munnell et al.’s initial efforts were roundly criticized by several 
other researchers. Mark Zandi326 and Glenn Harrison327 found the 
Boston Fed study results to be fairly fragile in that there was no sig-
nificant evidence of disparate treatment when additional explanatory 
variables were added to the regression equation. Theodore Day, Stan-
ley Lebovitz,328 and Zandi329 examined outliers and inconsistencies in 
the data. Once these researchers removed a substantial number of 
suspect observations from the Boston Fed study, they found no sig-
nificant differences in treatment.330 Other researchers claim the sam-
                                                                                                                                       
 322. See Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Da-
ta 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 92-7, 1992). 
 323. Id. at 18. 
 324. Id. at 2. 
 325. Id.
 326. Mark Zandi, Boston Fed’s Bias Study Was Deeply Flawed, AM. BANKER, Aug. 19, 
1993, at 13. 
 327. Glenn W. Harrison, Mortgage Lending in Boston: A Reconsideration of the Evi-
dence, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 29, 30 (1998). 
 328. Theodore E. Day & S. J. Liebowitz, Mortgage Lending to Minorities: Where’s the 
Bias?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 3, 4 (1998). 
 329. Zandi, supra note 326. 
 330. Another review also found many technical problems with the Boston Fed study 
but was more supportive of some of Munnell et al.’s qualitative conclusions. James H. Carr 
& Isaac F. Megbolugbe, The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study on Mortgage Lending 
Revisited, 4 J. HOUSING RES. 277 (1993). 
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ple of loan applicants in studies such as the Boston Fed study are un-
representative and the type of methodology utilized in such studies 
can generate misleading results.331
 Another issue addressed by Yezer, Phillips, and Trost332 and oth-
ers is that many of the independent variables are endogenous.333 For 
example, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is a key underwriting varia-
ble, and a higher LTV ratio should increase the probability of rejec-
tion. But the regression model assumes the LTV ratio is predeter-
mined by the applicant and not itself part of the underwriting 
process. An applicant who may be close to acceptance, but with some 
red flags such as a marginal credit score, may be counseled by a 
mortgage broker or bank employee to increase his or her down pay-
ment. Since the down payment is now determined as part of the same 
process as determining acceptance or rejection of the loan, it becomes 
difficult to interpret the coefficient of LTV as the effect of LTV on ac-
ceptance or rejection. Furthermore, if white lending officers, for ex-
ample, wittingly or unwittingly, offer more informal guidance on 
“proper” LTV ratios to white borrowers than to blacks, the effects of 
race on the mortgage decision is now confounded with LTV ratio.334
 Recently the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
sponsored a paired testing study of the mortgage preapplication 
                                                                                                                                       
 331. The Boston Fed Study and many of the studies evaluating it rely on single equa-
tion regression estimates that relate accept-reject decisions to a set of characteristics of 
households and the potential transaction. But only households who have successfully nego-
tiated to the point of making a formal application are included in HMDA data. Households 
must initially decide whether to apply for such a loan, whether to apply to an institution 
regulated that is required to submit HMDA data, and then typically undergo some initial 
two-sided screening in an initial meeting with a bank or mortgage origination employee be-
fore deciding whether to submit an application. Some studies have shown that single equa-
tion estimation methods that do not account for these early stages in the process can give 
misleading results. See, e.g., Anthony M.J. Yezer, Robert F. Phillips & Robert P. Trost, Bi-
as in Estimates of Discrimination and Default in Mortgage Lending: The Effects of Simul-
taneity and Self-Selection, 9 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 197 (1994). According to at least one 
researcher, they will most likely lead to false positives, i.e., evidence of racially disparate 
treatment when the underlying simulation model data contains no such discriminatory be-
havior by construction. Michael LaCour-Little, Identification of Discrimination in Mortgage 
Lending Markets 177 (July 26, 1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wis-
consin-Madison) (on file with Memorial Library, University of Wisconsin-Madison). Theo-
retically, of course, single equation estimation methods could yield false negatives as well. 
 332. Yezer, Phillips & Trost, supra note 331, at 202. 
 333. If some of the independent or explanatory variables in the regression relationship 
are in fact endogenous, i.e. also determined by the same process as the dependent variable, 
then it becomes difficult to interpret the estimated coefficient as the effect of the indepen-
dent variable on the dependent variable. A.H. STUDEMUND, USING ECONOMETRICS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 531-55 (3rd ed. 1997). 
 334. See Raphel W. Bostic, A Test of Cultural Affinity in Home Mortgage Lending, 23 J.
FIN. SERVICES RES. 89, 109 (2003) (finding “some evidence consistent with the notion of 
taste-based cultural affinity” which implies a “shying away from opposite race pairings ra-
ther than a seeking out of same-race pairings”); William C. Hunter & Mary Beth Walker, 
The Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and Mortgage Lending Decisions, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN. &
ECON. 57 (1996). 
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process conceptually similar to paired testing of real estate brokerage 
discussed above.335 The study was carried out in Los Angeles and 
Chicago and compared the experiences of Asian and Hispanic testers 
as well as blacks and whites. We focus on the black-white differen-
tial. The testers were again pairs of black and white individuals pro-
vided with identical scripts regarding their financial position and 
credit histories. They presented themselves to loan officers in a range 
of mortgage lending institutions and inquired about availability and 
terms of home mortgages. 
 Ross et al. presented unconditional fractions of occurrences when 
whites were favored at a given institution and of occurrences when 
blacks were favored, for each of several measures.336 They also pre-
sented multivariate results that controlled for lender characteristics 
(e.g., size of lender and whether the loan officer was white or black) 
and for tester “fixed effects” which are designed to remove results 
that might be systematically related to a particular tester (e.g., if a 
particular tester was less able to follow the script accurately).337
 Results were mixed. In the unconditional measures of Ross et al.’s 
Table 3, Chicago blacks were statistically disadvantaged in the origi-
nal information provided, the range of products discussed, the coach-
ing received to help complete a successful application, and in follow up 
after the meeting.338 There were no statistically significant differences 
between whites and blacks in the maximum loan amount suggested or 
whether lenders encouraged the borrower to apply for a Federal Hous-
ing Authority loan.339 In Los Angeles, the null hypothesis of no differ-
ence in treatment could not be rejected, except for one measure, the 
coaching and related assistance received by the borrower.340
 The multivariate results of Tables 6 and 7 generally exhibited fewer 
statistically significant differences between white and black treatment 
in both cities, although some remain.341 Blacks were less likely to be 
advised about alternatives for down-payment assistance in Chicago 
and more likely to be steered towards FHA lending in both cities.342
The multivariate results also provide a richer set of findings regarding 
interaction of borrower and lender characteristics. And it bears noting 
the results are very different in many respects across the two cities, 
                                                                                                                                       
 335. Stephen L. Ross, Margery Austin Turner, Erin Godfrey & Robin R. Smith, Mort-
gage Lending in Chicago and Los Angeles: A Paired Testing Study of the Pre-Application 
Process, 63 J. URBAN ECON. 902 (2008). 
 336. Id. at 911-12. 
 337. Id. at 913-17 (especially Tables 6 and 7). 
 338. Id. at 911. 
 339. Id.
 340. Id.
 341. Id. at 915-16. 
 342. Id.
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which of course have different racial and ethnic compositions, ho-
meownership rates, and so forth.343
 This paired testing study is suggestive and important but, as the 
authors are careful to point out, does not answer all the important 
questions about possible mortgage discrimination. It is important to 
note that this study is a study of the preapplication process. Paired 
testing cannot be used in any robust way to assess the mortgage ap-
proval process because federal law prohibits submitting false credit 
applications,344 and paired testing by its very nature requires the tes-
ters to utilize false information because the scripts that paired tes-
ters utilize are fictional. 
  The most recent concern about discrimination in lending concerns 
“steering” into subprime loans. There is no dispute that African Amer-
icans received a disproportionate share of subprime, or “high-cost” 
loans.345 But the relevant question is whether African Americans who 
qualified for prime mortgages were steered into subprime mortgages. 
Consistent with past studies, it is difficult to arrive at a dispositive an-
swer to this question. However, we do have evidence consistent with 
steering: after controlling for income and, importantly, lender type, 
African Americans are more likely to obtain high-cost loans than other 
borrowers.346 Unfortunately, the analysis to this point does not include 
a complete set of underwriting variables typically used to make loan 
decisions. Going forward, moreover, analysis will be difficult because 
many high-cost loans had no documentation of income and assets, thus 
making it impossible to know whether the borrower might have quali-
fied for a prime loan had they provided documentation. 
 Although almost all of the studies addressing possible discrimina-
tion in real estate finance we have reviewed focus upon urban real 
estate markets, we conclude our discussion with an unambiguous 
case of lending discrimination arising in a rural context and leading 
to substantial minority land loss through foreclosure and other dis-
tress sales. After claiming for decades that discrimination claims 
made by black farmers were unfounded,347 the USDA published a re- 
port in 1997 written by its Civil Rights Action Team (CRAT) that 
                                                                                                                                       
 343. According to tabulations of the 2000 U.S. Census, metropolitan Chicago was 19% 
black and 10% Hispanic, and that 68% of households owned. Los Angeles was 17% black 
and 44% Hispanic, and 49% of households owned. Data from U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 
Census of Population and Housing, Summary File 3: Technical Documentation 2000, 
available at www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/doc/sf3.pdf. 
 344. Id. at 903 n.3. 
 345. See, e.g., WILHELMINA A. LEIGH & DANIELLE HUFF, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL AND 
ECON. STUDIES, AFRICAN AMERICANS AND HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE SUBPRIME LENDING 
EXPERIENCE, 1995-2007 4-6 (2007).
 346. See Robert B. Avery, Kennth P. Brevoort & Glenn B. Canner, The 2007 HMDA 
Data, FED. RESERVE BULL., A107, A139 (Dec. 2008). 
 347. See Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction, supra note 100, at 529 n.146. 
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largely acknowledged the USDA had committed systemic discrimina-
tion against black and other minority farmers, including the very 
lending discrimination black farmers had long claimed.348 In 1999, 
the U.S. government settled a landmark class action lawsuit filed by 
African-American farmers against the USDA mostly based upon the 
claim that the USDA for decades had violated the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act by administering its credit and benefit programs in a 
discriminatory way and by failing to investigate and resolve the far-
mers’ discrimination claims in a proper way.349
 We include this well-documented case of governmental lending 
discrimination as a case of discrimination in real estate finance be-
cause many of the black farmers in Pigford have claimed that the 
USDA required black farmers to use their real estate as collateral to 
secure non-real estate operating loans350 but did not require white 
farmers to do the same. Further, the lending discrimination alleged 
in Pigford included the claim that the USDA improperly delayed 
processing of loan applications to black farmers, which resulted in 
the loan funds arriving either very late in the planting season or even 
after the planting season was over, rendering these loans of limited 
benefit to black farmers and increasing the risk that these farmers 
would face foreclosure.351 Other black farmers have claimed, for ex-
ample, that the USDA forced them into foreclosure by refusing to ad-
just loan repayment terms for black farmers experiencing temporary 
financial difficulty as a result of catastrophic weather conditions but 
the USDA did adjust repayment terms for similarly situated white 
farmers who faced the same weather conditions.352
 The CRAT report concluded that minority farmers “have lost sig-
nificant amounts of land and potential farm income as a result of 
[USDA] discrimination.”353 Despite the fact that under the nearly 
completed claims process established under the Pigford settlement 
black farmers have received slightly over $1 billion in compensa-
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tion,354 a recent report published by the Government Accountability 
Office has indicated the USDA has largely failed to establish man-
agement systems necessary to respond effectively to ongoing and se-
rious discrimination claims.355
 To summarize the scholarly literature on racial discrimination in 
real estate finance—(1) most studies to date have focused on urban 
residential mortgages; (2) simple tabulations of data (e.g., mortgage 
approvals from HMDA) always find large unconditional racial dispar-
ities; but (3) when other characteristics of the transaction, especially 
borrower credit histories, are included, the racial effect is mitigated 
and sometimes—but not always—disappears (in the sense of statis-
tical significance). Even the best studies to date have yet to deal suc-
cessfully with important issues of sample selection and endogenous, 
“independent” variables, so this literature remains unsettled. 
 Our review of discrimination in real estate transactions and real 
estate finance does raise the possibility that when property is sold at 
a forced sale, whether the forced sale involved is a taking, a partition 
sale, a tax sale, or some other type of forced sale, the race of the 
property owner may affect the sale price. At a minimum, further 
study should be conducted to follow up on the case studies on parti-
tion sales presented by the Associated Press in its Torn from the 
Land series on black land loss. These case studies suggest, but do not 
prove, black-owned property was sold for prices well below the forced 
sale prices that white property owners can expect to receive when 
their properties are sold at forced partition sales. Subsequent re-
search could help determine whether the case studies the Associated 
Press utilized or the case studies of eminent domain in Madison, Wis-
consin we highlighted earlier on this Article signal the existence of a 
more general racial pattern in which minorities suffer a “double dis-
count” at forced sales of one type or another, which in turn would be 
one factor that could be contributing to maintaining the seemingly 
intractable racial wealth gap.
VII.   CONCLUSION
Our Article has demonstrated that the scholarship and case law 
on forced sales of property owned by many low- to middle-class prop-
erty owners under regimes such as the default rules governing te-
nancy in common ownership often has failed to consider the negative 
economic impact of such forced sales. A comparative-law perspective 
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on forced sales in different substantive areas of the law renders visi-
ble the possible adverse economic impact of forced sales that has re-
mained unseen and largely unaddressed when low- to middle-class 
property owners have their real property forcibly sold, whether under 
eminent domain or under partition sales. Therefore, though it may be 
reasonable for judges to order a forced sale in one context or another 
to promote certain policy objectives, such sales should not be ordered 
based upon an unjustifiably optimistic notion that the sales are likely 
to be wealth-maximizing in most instances. 
 This Article also highlights the manner in which the economic sta-
tus of a property owner may determine the extent to which his or her 
real property holdings are shielded from possibly wealth-depleting 
forced sales. For example, as the discussion of Section 1031 like-kind 
exchanges involving tenancies in common revealed, those who have 
greater financial resources and human capital often, through private 
ordering, structure their property ownership in such a way as to 
avoid potentially economically-devastating forced sales. In addition to 
retaining transactional attorneys and other business professionals to 
help them structure ownership in the first instance, wealthier prop-
erty owners also vigorously seek to protect—or even enhance—their 
wealth in those instances in which their property becomes subject to 
a forced sale. In contrast, less wealthy property owners often are not 
well positioned to structure their property ownership to ensure its 
stability or to litigate the issue of valuation in a vigorous manner to 
protect their wealth when their property is subjected to a forced sale. 
 Finally, our Article has at least raised the possibility that the race 
of a property owner may affect the price they can expect to receive in 
forced sales of real property of one type or another. Although many 
have studied the role that race may play in various real estate and 
housing markets, we raise the possibility for the first time that racial 
price discrimination may exist in the context of forced sales of real 
property. If minorities are either more at risk of having their proper-
ty sold at a forced sale as a result of owning property under more un-
stable conditions than white property owners or if minorities suffer a 
“double discount” when their property is sold at a forced sale, then it 
would be necessary to address these issues as part of a comprehen-
sive and concerted campaign to close the racial wealth gap. 
